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BEING AND UNIVERSALS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF QUINE AND ITS RELEVANCE TO AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

by

 AKPAN ETOROBONG GODWIN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION                                                                                     1

CHAPTER ONE:         THE  BACKGROUND OF QUINEAN ONTOLOGY        

1.                 Intellectual Emergence of  Quine                                                3

2.                 Quine  and  Dewey                                                          3

3.                 Carnap’s  Ontology                                                                   5

CHAPTER TWO:        THE PROBLEM OF ONTOLOGICAL CONFUSION       

1.                 Wrong  Characterization of Ontological  Statements         9

2.                 Synthetic-Analytic Cleavage                                             9

3.                 Reductionism                                                                            14

4.                 The Basis of Ontological  Confusion                                17

CHAPTER THREE: QUINEAN SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM

   OF MEANING AND REFERENCE                          

1.                 The Theory of Description                                                        20     

2.                 Translation  and Meaning                                                 22

3.                 Indeterminacy of Reference and Ontological Relativity.     29

CHAPTER FOUR:       BEING AND UNIVERSALS IN QUINEAN

ONTOLOGY                                                       

1.                 Ontological  Commitment                                                          35

2.                 Problems of Universals                                                    39

3.                 Evaluation                                                                       42

CHAPTER FIVE: QUINEAN BEING AND UNIVERSALS AND

IT RELEVANCE TO AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY.          

1.                 Quine and African Philosophy                                         46

2.                 Conclusion.                                                                    50

Works cited

INTRODUCTION

Schooled or unschooled, man is vested with the responsibility of making intelligible every data of everyday’s experience.  This responsibility is manifested in the natural desire to know, which has pushed men to ask many questions, about the nature of reality.  These questions are at once philosophical and the beginning of the philosophical enterprise.  Prominent among the questions philosophers ask, is that of being.  The question of being has found diverse formulations in the different periods of philosophy.  Associated with the question of the nature of being is that of the ontological status of universals.

Quine is of the opinion that ontological   questions suffer confusion within Empiricism because of confusion of meaning with  naming.  Thus, he feels that the statement of ontological  starting point of ontological  investigation should be the  clearing of this confusion.  His clearing  of the  confusion results   in indeterminacy of  meaning,  of  reference, and relativity  of ontological  reference.  It is   this  relativity  of ontological  reference that conditions his  ontological  commitment, and his  treatment  of the problem  of being and universals.

The  focus of this paper is  to show what Quine says there is and  the consequence of such  for the problem of  universal and the   relevance  of that ontological  system to African philosophy.  In doing  this,  the paper takes into consideration Quine’s  philosophical  background, the problem of ontological   confusion, the  problems of meaning  and reference their solutions and  Quine’s  notion  of being  and universals and  its relevance to African philosophy.

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND  OF QUINEAN ONTOLOGY

1.                 The Intellectual Emergence of Quine

Every philosophy has within it the  imprints of the age,  culture,  environment and persons responsible for its existence.  This has conspicuously manifested itself in the philosophy  of Williard V. O. Quine.   This name  refers to an American  philosopher and logician, who was born in 1908 and happened to live and   flourish in the twentieth (20th) century.

Quine  began  studies under the tutelage of Alfred North  Whitehead, in Harvard University.  But  following  the attractions of Logical positivism,  he got converted to it in the 1930s.  Consequently, he left Harvard and became  a student  of  Carnap,  an important figure in the movement,  at about the  same time.

His inclination to pragmatism  drew him closer to the naturalism of  Dewey.  These and many other influences join forces together to mould  the Quinean philosophical orientation.

2.                 Quine and Dewey

In his ‘Ontological Relativity and other Essays’ (1969) Quine professes his bond with Dewey over naturalism.  In this respect,  his views concerning the study of knowledge, mind and  meaning are Deweyian.  This he states as thus:

Philosophically I am bound  to Dewey by the  naturalism that dominated his last three decades.  With Dewey I hold  that knowledge, mind,  and meaning are part of the same world that they  have to  do with, and that they are to be studied in the same empirical  spirit that animates natural  science.  (Quine, 1969:26).

The consequences of this belief are exciting to note.  Quine like Dewey reduces meaning to being the property of behaviour, language to being its mode of behaviour and meaning to  being  understood only as what is expressed in behaviour or all dispositions to behaviour known or unknown.  Quine also rejects with Dewey, the view of uncritical semantics which is the myth of a museum  (The myth holds that meanings are the entities meant while languages are labels).

The gravest consequence of this affinity with Deweyian naturalism  is  his denial, with Dewey of the existence of matter of  fact in ontological  issues.  It must be  noted that Quine is not  here saying that there is no reality.  It is rather that what is known is of  conceptualization, which  is quite torrential in comparison with its meager input.  Thus,  it becomes absurd to seek  a reference,  which is founded  on a one-to-one correspondence between  the scheme and its input when we know that the output is far greater than the  input.    He,  therefore,  directs attention  to background language as a ground for reference.  The ideal which  guides the creation  of such language is convenience.

The  first position stands in opposition  to Carnap’s view (Quine’s teacher), which holds a contrary view, as proposed by radical   reductionism .  But the last sentence agrees with Carnap’s views on  conceptual   schemes.

3.                 Carnap’s Ontology

Although Quine  acknowledges that no one has influenced this philosophical  thoughts more than Carnap (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:597), it is also revealing  to note that no  one has suffered the consequence of Quine’s  critical  philosophical  preoccupation more than Carnap. 

Carnap held  unto  the views of  reductionism  and allowed it to influence his general  philosophical concerns.  Using it as the  basis for his ontology,  he writes as follows:

If someone  wishes to speak  in his language about a new kind of entities he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking,   subject to new rules:  we shall call this  procedure the construction  of a linguistic  framework for the new entities in question.  And now we must distinguish two kind of  question of existence: First,  questions of the existence of certain  entities of the new kinds,  within  the framework,’ we call them  internal  questions and second  questions concerning the ‘existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external questions, Carnap, (cited in Feigl, 1972:586).

The above quotation hits two  important points within  the context of our discourse.  One is the  discovery of Carnap’s  conception of scientific schemes as dependent on language.  According to Carnap, one can   speak  of new entities so long as he devices a new system   of language for doing so.  Consequently, questions of ontology are to an extent questions of schemes or internal questions.   This  gave a good lead to  Quine’s theory of Ontological  Relativity,  which uses  background  as its reference point.

Secondly, it reveals Quine’s main  disagreement with  Carnap as an individual and Logical  Positivism as a movement.  Quine argues that Carnap’s distinction  between  internal  and external questions of  existence is founded on the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, (Quine cited in Feigl, 1972:601).  This distinction he rejects, in his Two Dogmas of  Empiricism (1971), as an  unempirical  dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical  article  of faith (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:89).

For Quine, the only  real questions are the internal questions and nothing more.  Quine observes that Carnap’s  adherence to the contrary  view promotes illusion, rather than knowledge.  The basic illusion is reductionism, which is  the belief that there is one-to-one correspondence between  statements and the external world.

Thus,  to overcome such illusions as expressed by Carnap, Quine offers the  following clarifications  regarding ontological  issues:  “Ontological questions, likewise questions of logical  and mathematical  principles (and every scientific hypothesis) are questions not of fact but of choosing a convenient conceptual  scheme or framework for science”  (Quine, cited in Feige, 1972:601).

To hold  the contrary  view, therefore,  is to confuse  truth  with an illusive desire.  Quine argues this thesis very extensively in his Two Dogmas of Empiricism.  The consequence is the rejection of absolute reference.  The rejection  gives rise to relative reference which carves an avenue for ontological  relativity.   It reduces ontological  controversy to that about  language or schemes  (i.e the quest for correspondence with background language).  The Quinean belief is  based on  the argument that the output is greater than the input.  The consequence is the untenability  of reduction  and by  implication synthetic-analytic cleavage which presumes the truth of the former (reductionism).  Thus,  the  same linguistic consideration of ontological issue,  which influenced Carnap,  led Quine to reject the dogma, which Carnap professes with it.  The secret  is Quine’s ability to clear the illusion that beclouds Carnap’s thoughts;  misconception of meaning and reference, leading to ontological  confusions.

CHAPTER TWO

THE PROBLEM OF ONTOLOGICAL   CONFUSION

1.                 Wrong Characterization  of Ontological  Statements.

Radical reductionism  which is  the view that every  meaningful statement is that which is translatable into a  statement  (true or false) about  immediate experience is hooked  up with  the verification theory of meaning.   “This  theory  states that the meaning of a statement  is the method of empirically confirming or infirming it (Quine, cited in Feigh, 1972:90).  Here, there would have to be a limiting  case,  which is confirmed  come what may.  The statement in this case is analytic.  What this reveals  is a dual characterization of statements, viz analytic or synthetic and a belief that a meaningful statement must be a statement  with  empirical  reference.  What is evident in the second part of this confused characterization of statements  as Quine would  put it, is the confusion of  meaning with reference.  

Quine believes, that the clarification  of these concepts and their correct  employment in ontological  discourse is a route to having  a sound ontological  theory.

2.                 Synthetic – Analytic Cleavage

The  synthetic  - analytic cleavage as shown above is related to the verification theory of meaning, which  in turn is related to reductionism.  In this connection, the analysis of one logically leads to the analysis of the other.  Following the example of Quine, which  appears to make the  matter simple  and clear this  paper begins with the analysis  of synthetic – analytic dogma, because, it allows for careful attention  to analyticity.  It synthetic aspect is well  represented in the treatment of reductionism.

The Quinean point of departure on the investigation of the distinction  between  analytic and synthetic statements hinges on the investigation of  the meaning of  analyticity.  Reporting the Kantian  view on the matter, he states, that an analytic statement is one, the truth of which depends on  meaning and independent of facts,  whereas a synthetic statement, is one,  the truth of which is dependent  on facts  (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:81).  Quine,  leaves off the analysis of synthetic statement to  face its analytic counterpart, because he believes that the former has its place in radical  reductionism,  which shall be examined afterwards.  He begins by asking for  the meaning of analyticity.  In asking  this question, he threatens the foundation of the synthetic-analytic cleavage.  According to him “both dogmas .. are ill  founded”  (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:81).  Thus, he  calls to question the various  basis on which the  first dogma is founded.  They  include; meaning,  definitions,  interchangeability  and semantical rule.

In the analysis of meaning to discover how much  it can  support the  notion of analyticity, Quine warns that meaning  should not be  identified with naming  because terms can name  the same thing but differ in  meaning (Quine,  cited in Feigl, 1972:81).  Quine urges that the naming  view of meaning should be abandoned for its alternative, which holds that “the primary business of the theory of meaning is simply the synonymy of linguistic forms and the analyticity of statements” (Quine, cited in Feigl,  1972:82).  But this only  resurrects the  problem  of analyticity.

In want of progress,  Quine  resorts to the  use of  popular examples; They are:

No unmarried man is  married  -   (1)

No bachelor is married              -     (2), (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:82).

Quine observes that the analytic statement  of the first class remains true under all possible  reinterpretations of its components other than the logical  particles (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:82).  Yet the analyticity of those of the second class is unclear.

According  to him, there has been  a belief that statements of the second class can turn  to those of the first class by putting  synonyms for  synonyms.  But  he argues, that the notion  of synonymy is in need of clarification as  analyticity itself.

Quine  also observes, that some  persons  have argued, that the  analytic statement  of the second class can turn  to those of the  first by  definition.  But  Quine  argues, that definition reports selected instance of synonymy and such arises from usage (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:82).  “So,  just what the  interconnections may be, which  are necessary  and sufficient in order that two linguistic forms be properly  describable as synonymous, is  far from clear” (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:83).  The notion of interchangeability depends again on cognitive synonymy (recognizable at first sight).  But such according to Quine, depends on the knowledge of analyticity of statements.  It is only an analytic statement that can offer such cognizance.  This argument is back to the  notion of analyticity.  Quine observes this in  the following statements:

Analyticity at first seemed most naturally  definable by  appeal to a realm of meanings.  On refinement, the appeal  to meanings gave way to appeal to synonymy or definition. But definition turned out to be best understood only by  dint of a prior appeal  to analyticity itself (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:87).

One may  ask,  what is analyticity?  Some have argued that the question can be answered by recourse  to artificial language.  But Quine argues, that recursion to semantical rules and artificial   language is incapable of solution to the problem.  According to him:

The gravity of the problem is not  perceptibly less for the artificial languages than for  natural  ones.  The problem of making sense of the idiom ‘S is analytic for L’, with  variable ‘S’ and ‘L’ retains its stubbornness even if  we limit the range of the variable ‘L’ to  artificial   language (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:87).

Quine argues, that the problem  with such expression  is that “we understand what expressions the rule attribute analyticity to, but we do not understand what the rule attributes to those  expressions”  (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:88).  In  other words we are unaware  of what ‘analytic’ or  ‘analytic for’ means.  Furthermore, it is difficult to say what a semantical rule is except by identification as heading in writing.  Consequently  semantical rule stands in need of explanation as analyticity, itself.

After the  foregoing exposition of the difficulties inherent in any adherence to the synthetic-anlytic cleavage, Quine states an equally  faulty but most likely  characterization of ontological statements, as follows:

It is  obvious that truth in general  depends on both  language and extra linguistic fact.   The  statement ‘Brutus killed Caesar’ would be false if  the world had been   different in certain  ways,  but it would also be false if the  word ‘killed’ happened rather to have the  sense of ‘begat’.  Thus,  one is tempted to suppose in general  that the  truth of a statement  is  somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a  factual component.  Given  this  supposition it next seems reasonable  that in some  statements the  factual component should  be null, and these are analytic statements (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:89).

Quine does not  take side with this supposition.  For  to do so, would   be to encourage an illusion  as well as give rise to  radical  reductionism.  This  explains why Quine decided to call the supposition a ‘temptation’. A clearer version of his interpretation is expounded in Reductionism, below.

3.                 Reductionism

Quine  becomes really  strict over the issues of  the  charaterization of ontological statements by positing that:

It is nonsense and the root  of much  nonsense to speak of a linguistic component and a factual  component in the truth of any individual statement.  Taken collectively science has its double dependence  upon language and experience; but this duality is  not significantly traceable into the  statement of science taken  by one (Quine,  cited in Feigl, 1972:92).

This position was not  introduced by Quine.  It had already been held  by  Duhem.

Accordingly, for him, it is the whole  science that faces the  tribunal of experience, not individually but as a corporate body.  Thus, the demand for a one-to-one correspondence between our statement  and the external  world is absurd.  Quine has drawn this conclusion to include the whole of his philosophical system.  The act  is based on his philosophy  that a clear conception of the theory  of meaning and reference holds the key to a sound ontology.  The reaction was also apt  against the dogma of reductionism, which states that “every meaningful  statement is held to be translatable into a statement  about  immediate experience” (Quine, cited Feigh 1972:90).  The beliefs of the proponents of this doctrine is that to each  statement or each  synthetic statement,  there is associated a unique range of possible sensory events, such that the occurrence of any of them  would add to the likelihood of truth of the statement,  and that  there is  associated also  another unique range of possible  sensory  events whose occurrence  would  detract from the likelihood  (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:91).  But this view according to Quine, is untrue and can only  be held by one who, until  now, is  unaware of the truth, that our  output  is more than our input.  Thus, one-to-one correspondence of reference, with regards to the external  world  is not possible.  Yet our ontology  can be  questioned relatively  to background schemes.

Thus, the search  for absolute reference which is based on the belief that our  statements are reports of immediate experience is misleading.  Quine makes this point  in the following  observations:

the totality  of our  so called knowledge or beliefs, from the  most casual matters of geography  and history to the  profoundest  laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:92).

In this  position,  Quine  destroys any possible basis for either of the dogmas and creates a new conception of our science.  Science is a tool in the hands of men for  structuring of their experience and the prediction  of future possible  occurrences.  It is absurd, therefore, to query  such a scheme for absolute correspondence with  experience.    Quine observes that the ground for the temptation to such querying is reductionism which is itself  based on the confusion  of meaning with naming (reference).  The  consequence of the above for ontology is the inability to deny ontological  statements about non being, and it results in the imputation of being,  where we could have been content to acknowledge nothing (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:545).  Thus, radical  reductionism  is the basis of ontological confusion.

4.                 The Basis of  Ontological Confusion

The basis of ontological confusion  is radical  reductionism.  Any other confusion  is built  on it.  The belief that every  meaningful statement is reducible to statements about  immediate experience  has serious ontological  implications.  There is first,  the equation  of meaning  with  naming.  Thus, for a statement to be meaningful, it  has to  foot an ontological  bill.  It will have  to name some  entities.  Though Quine,  has repudiated this   point, his analysis of the issue  has up till now not surfaced in this project.  The second implication is the  imputation of non being  where we would  have been  content to acknowledge nothing.  A typical  example of this is what Quine  calls the  Plato’s Beard  (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972: 545).  According  to the Beard,  nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise,  what is it that there is not.  The notion of “it that there is not”, here denotes that the mention of nonbeing refers to some named entity otherwise that statement would have been meaningless.  Thus, one consequence has root  in the other.    The beard Quine  opines, has ‘for ages dulled  the edge of Ockham’s razor (Ockham’s razor states that entities need not be  multiplied beyond necessity).  According to the view,  it is nonsense to try to  deny the existence of nonbeing (nothing)  at all.  If it is non-existent, it means we cannot be talking about  anything when  we mention it.  Thus any  attempt to deny it tantamount to nonsense.  Yet when  we talk about it,  something of it is understood, which  means that it has being  in some  sense,  otherwise our statement will not be meaningful.  Note that meaning here is   used as if it were naming.  Just like the denial  of a known  and a real being  tantamounts to self contradiction the denial  of nonbeing results in nonsense.  Thus, to avoid this quandary and to maintain  coherence with the system, nonbeing  is   imputed with being.  Such that nonbeing is said to be.

The difficulty experienced, therefore,  in any attempt to deny affirmative statements  about   nonbeing, is  inability to formulates the denial without incoherence and confusions.

Quine observes that  any affirmation  of the being  of nonbeing has no sound basis.  The only possible  reference is to the fact, that nonbeing exist either as ideas in the minds of  men or as some unactualised  possibles.  But  Quine  argues, that the denial  of nonbeing  is not the denial  of the idea in mentality, but the  view,  that there  is no  such thing within  space and time.  Even the  notion of mentality  as a real existence is unacceptable to Quine.

The  consequence of the commitment  to this  type of  Ontology  is the needles multiplication of entities in the world  (the dulling  of the edge of Ockham’s  razor).  This confusion  is rooted in  reductionism which in turn  is rooted in the  view of meaning in terms of   objective reference (naming).  Quine  views that to move a step further in the  formulation of sound  ontology, one has to clear  the beard and the confusion in the conception  of meaning as naming.  This feat according  to Quine, has been  achieved by Russell in his Theory  of description.

CHAPTER THREE

QUINEAN  SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF MEANING AND REFERENCE

1.                 The Theory  of Description

The analysis  of the Quinean  system   of thought reveals that a clear understanding of the theory of meaning and reference holds the key to  sound  ontological  commitment.  This explains his effort in employing  Russell’s theory  of Description as an instrument for demonstrating the possibility of  speaking without  any  particular ontological  commitment, especially, to  universals.

The Russellian  theory  of description is of the  opinion, that there is  a sense in which we can speak  meaningfully about  objects without countenancing an ontology.  This  we can do through contextual definition.  This definition Quine  argues was first developed  by Bentham,  who called it paraphrases and  has since remained  dormant until  it flowered lately  in Russell’s theory of description.  Russell’s theory  affords a rigorous and an important way of how expressions can be made to parade as names and then be  explained away as a mere manner  of speaking, by  explicit paraphrase of the context into  an innocent notation.

The  main  aim of  the theory as used here by Quine, is to counter reductionism  and thus  demonstrate that terms need not name  entities to be meaningful.  It is also aimed to show how statement about nonbeing can be negated without contradiction or confusion.    So the  theory  uses descriptive names which are themselves complex names.    For instance,  the king of France, the author of  Waverly  and the round square copula in Berkeley  college.  They are actually  to be  fragments of sentence.  Then descriptive phrases are to be   followed by  bound  variables or variables of quantification, which  are: every, nothing, something.

Now taking  the author of Waverley  was a  poet as an instance, Russell proceeds thus:  Something  wrote Waverley and was a poet and nothing else wrote  Waverley (the  second part is added because of the article “the”). The  alternation of this gives; either each thing failed to write  Waverley or two or  more things  wrote Waverley.  This  Quine believes negates that first assertion   without being  guilty of contradiction or incoherence,  and without  naming any particular entity,  it is  meaningful.  The bound variable  in this case are free and are not tight down to naming particular entities.  But they  can  represent anything that falls within  their range. 

“To subsume a one word term under Russell’s theory  the word  has to be translated,  first, into  description” (Quine, cited in Feigl 1972:548).  Thus,  the word ‘Etorobong is’, can be translated into “the  youngman that studied at Unical in 2002”.  After that,  the  same  process as above,  can be applied.  If the  word is  obscure, Russell prescribes the  “ex-hypothesis” – being  Etoroobong.   Hence,  it could be translated into  is – Etorobong or the thing  that Etorobongizes.  In this  way Quine thinks  that  Russell’s theory of description has surmounted the Plato’s  Beard, which states that nonbeing  must in some sense be otherwise what is it, that there is  not (Quine, cited in Feigl, 1972:545).  Quine also feels  that the confusion  of meaning  with naming  has been  overcome.  A statement  can be  meaningful without  purporting  to name entities.

Quine believes that his new disposition  makes ontological commitment  free and selective.  We commit ourselves to the ontology of a particular entity when we affirm its being but we do not when we negate it.  So it is all left to us to decide to allow our bound variables range over a certain  realm  of entities.

Though the above  analysis tells us how to avoid  the beard and the confusion  of meaning with reference,  it tells us nothing  about  meaning and reference themselves.  What is meaning?  What is  reference?   How are they to be conceived?

2.                 Meaning and Translation 

The  Quinean  approach to the study  of meaning  is naturalistic.  It is  all hooked up with the naturalism of Dewey.

Here, meaning is to be  studied empirically.  This is  informed by  the understanding  of meaning as a property of behaviour.  Quine observes that Dewey was explicit on this point: “meaning… is not a psychic existence; it is primarily a property of behaviour; (Dewey, cited in Quine, 1969:27).  The naturalistic conception of meaning stands in opposition to Wittgenstein’s copy theory  which  is a good  version of uncritical  semantics.  In this light  naturalism posits that it is the  very fact about meaning  and  not meant entities that must be  construed in term of overt behaviour.

The mode of behaviour   of which meaning is a property is language. “Language is a social art which we acquired on the evidence solely of other people’s overt bahaviour under publicly recognizable circumstance.  Language is specifically a mode of interaction of at least two beings, a speaker and a hearer… It is, therefore, a relationship” (Quine, 1969:27). Therefore, meaning as a   property of behaviour, is a property of language. Meanings are first and foremost meanings of language.

Consequently, to know the meaning of an expression is to take into consideration the overt behaviour of the speaker.  This involves, hearing the phonetic part, being conscious of the stimulus and being aware that the speaker is responding to that particular stimulus and not another.  In this way, the meaning of the expression would be revealed.  Thus,  Quine advices that,  “even in complex and obscure parts of language learning, the  learner has no data to work  with but the  overt behaviour of the other speaker” (Quine  1969:28).

The belief implicit in this demonstration is absolute behaviourism.   This view that all of people’s mental life is expressible in overt behaviour leaves much to be desire. Yet even if this were to be granted, Quine still observed that there is a problem with his naturalistic conception of meaning.  This observation, he opine as follows: “when with Dewey we turn thus toward a naturalistic view of language and a behavioural view of meaning, what we give up is not just the museum figure of speech.  We give up an assurance of determinacy.   Thus,  even though  language  of which  meaning is a property  is socially  learnt,  it is  still  difficult to say when  a particular behaviour had  one meaning and not another, (Quine 1969:28).

Using the notion of likeness in meaning to expose the difficulty involved in determining the meaning of an expression, Quine states the following:

When… we recognize with Dewey that “meaning… is primarily a property of behaviour”, we recognize that there are no meanings, nor likeness nor distinctions of meaning, beyond what are implicit in people’s dispositions to overt behaviour.  For  naturalism the question whether two expressions are alike or unlike in meaning has no determinate answer, known or unknown, except in so far as the answer is settled  in principles by people’s speech dispositions,  known or unknown,  (Quine 1969:29).

In the final analysis, one discovers that this indeterminacy appears to be hopeless.  The solution given to it is somewhat arbitrary.  The   possibility of communication is lost and understanding becomes impossible.

The indeterminacy of translation from one expression to another, with a view to ascertaining likeness in meaning is more difficult in the realm of radical translation.  Radical   translation is the translation from one language to another of some remote existence.  However, its radicality hinges mostly on the fact that even the manual of such translation is put in need of understanding and translation as well.

Radical translation is that made from one remote language to the linguist’s language.  In this case, the linguist is still to depend on the overt behaviour of the speakers.  Quine. Observes that in radical translation it is difficult to decide what the native expresses.   No amount of queuing of the native for assent or dissent in the face of the same datum can reveal what meaning the behaviour carries or what aspect of the stimulus, the native is responding to.

In seeking remedy in such matters, Quine suggests the use of what he calls the ‘analytical hypotheses.  This is the abstraction of native particles and constructions from   observed sentences and a speculative (imaginative) association of such with the linguist home language, (Quine 1969:32).  The particle and constructions involved are: “pluralizations, pronouns, numerals, identity and related devices”, (Quine 1969:32).  However, the difficulty here is that there is possibility of varied analytical hypotheses, because they are created out of convenience.  Such   possibility gives rise to the possibility of varied and incompatible translations of a particular native expression using compensatory adjustments of particles within the system(s).  This only intensifies the indeterminacy of radical translation.  Quine expresses this as thus:

The indeterminacy of translation is that rival systems of analytical  hypotheses can  conform to all  speech  dispositions within each of the  languages concerned and yet dictate in countless cases, utterly disparate translations; not mutual paraphrasing, but translation  each of which would be excluded by the  other system  of  translation.  Two such translations might even be potently contrary in truth-value, provided there is no stimulation that would encourage assent to either, (Quine 1960:74).

One can then ask, which of the translations can be said to correctly represent the meaning of the native expression?  The answer is that it is not determinate except as expressed in overt behaviour.  It has just been displayed that the hope for overt behaviour is every unfounded.  The solution could be like somewhat personal restriction on the part of the linguist.  If he should do that, then what he undecided is his own and never objective.  Quine expresses the difficulty in this matter in the following manner:

I would urge that what is most generally involved is indeterminacy of correlations.  There is  less basis of comparison – less sense in saying what is good  translation  and what is bad – the  further we get away  from sentences with  visible direct conditioning  to non-verbal  stimuli and the farther we get off home  ground, (Quine 1960:78).

This submission appears to give peace to the sanguine temperaments.  It is rather unfortunate that the problem is not as easy as it has just appeared.  Even at the periphery, it is difficult to settle the translation of expressions.  An example Quine normally uses is “Gavagai”.  He observes that it is  difficult to  decide by overt behaviour whether this  expression should translate into  ‘rabbit’ or ‘undetached rabbit part’ or ‘rabbit’ stage’, if  the  native should say it as a rabbit passes by.    According to Quine, ostension cannot solve the problem.  It is only the use of apparatus of individuation that spell some hope.  However, the firmness of that hope is lost again when one discovers that these apparatus of individuation are the particles and constructions of analytical hypothesis.  The corollary is that they are variant and are only capable of yielding variant translations.   The same problem is faced even in our home language.  It is forever difficult to decide whether the same phoneme in our mouth is what our neighbour is expressing.  In case of such difficulties,   the recursion had ever been to the principle of charity, (Quine 1969:46).

One point that is clear in the above analysis is that there is no fixed given standard for translation such that indeterminacy could be obviated.  All models are hypothetical and sometimes chosen arbitrarily.  This makes the standard for overcoming indeterminacy relative.  Quines position has simply succeeded in distorting the theory of meaning and the possibility of communication. 

The above analysis revealed more than the indeterminacy of meaning and translation.  Equally revealed is the indeterminacy of reference.  Reference is also inscrutable.  For instance, it was difficult to decide whether “gavagai” referred to rabbit’, ‘undetached rabbit part’, or ‘rabbit stage’.

3.                 Indeterminacy of Reference and Ontological  Relativity

The indeterminacy of translation now confronting us, however, cuts across extension and intension alike.  The terms ‘rabbit’, ‘undetached rabbit part’ and ‘rabbit stage’ differ not only in meaning; they are true of different things.  “Reference itself proves behaviourally inscrutable”, (Quine 1969:35).

Quine, however, argues that at the level of uncritical assumption of apparatus of individuation (the apparatus of pronouns, pluralization, identity, numerals, and so on) as given and fixed, there is no mystery about extension; terms have the same extension when true of the same things. At the level  of  radical  translation, on  the other hand,  extension itself goes inscrutable.  At the  second level,  however, the apparatus (manuals) themselves are in need of  translation as the  expressions.  Here what happened to  meaning  befalls  reference.

Indeterminacy  of reference apart from being  aided by radical  translation is promoted by vagueness  and ambiguity  of singular and general  terms.  Quine  argues that:

Insofar as it  is left unsettled  how far down the spectrum toward yellow or up toward  blue a thing can  be  and still count as green, “green” is vague.  Insofar as it is  left unsettled where to withheld muddy water in favour of wet mud, ‘water’ and ‘mud’ are vague.  Insofar as it is left unsettled how far from the  summit of the Mount Rainier one can be and still count as on Mount Rainier, ‘Mount Rainier’ is vague. Thus  vagueness affects not only  general  terms,  but  singular terms as well, (Quine 1960:126).

Furthermore,  “a singular term naming a physical object can be vague in point of the boundaries of that object in space-time, while a general  term can  be vague in point  of the marginal hanger- on of its extension”, (Quine 1960:126).  Commonly  general  terms; true of physical  objects, according  to Quine,  will be  vague in two ways  as to the  inclusion  or exclusion  of marginal  objects.  Thus, the general  term  mountain  is vague on how much terrain  to reckon into each of the score of indisputable mountains, and it is vague on the  score of  what lesser eminence to count as mountains at all.

At the level of vagueness the inscrutability  appears as if it were surmountable.  But the reality of its intensity  stands out  when considered from other view points.  For instance, ambiguity  and one to one correspondence.  An ambiguous term is one  that is  true of many  things.  For instance, the term ‘green’ is true as a singular abstract term  and as a concrete general term.   When the  reference in behaviour is to one  and not to the other cannot be determined,  except within  a sentence.  Yet both cases are learnt by pointing to the same thing.  The Implication here is that  ostension  cannot solve the problem of indeterminacy of reference in the face of ambiguity.

The problem of reference increases when there is demand for a one-to-one correspondence between  language and its input (experiences).  Quine observes that it is an error  in thought to seek  such  correspondence. This he opines as thus:

The voluminous and  intricately structured talk that comes out bears little evident correspondence to the past and present barrage of non-verbal  stimulation: Yet it is to such stimulation  that we must look to for  whatever empirical  content there may  be, (Quine 1960:26).

Again, experience come in  some kind of  immediacy and passes away.  Hence expression about experience is an expression about what is no more there.  They  are all our way of  talking about experience.  This explains why  Quine feels that it is futile to seek a real reference at all  in experience.  Again it explains why Quine is later to say that there is no fact of the  matter because the  fact expressed is not there for reference.  It is all our conceptualization of  what is experienced.  Input  is so meager compared to the  torrential output we pour out.  So, the  reasonableness in a one-to-one enquiry  for external  reference  lacks foundation.  Quine argues that inscrutability of  reference is not inscrutability  of fact. There  is no fact of the matter, (1969:47).  There  could not have been  any fact of the matter because the very things which we query against experience are objects of our torrential conceptualization.  We are rather querying experience to produce  facts for our conceptualization of experience , which  are majorly   past ones.

The  above position  does not make nonsense of reference.  It  rather carves an avenue for resolving  the  quandary.  Quine opines that we can  make sense when we are referring to things because of some initial  background permutation.  The way  in which this permutation was initially  carried out is expressed in the following way:

Begin by picturing  us at home in our language with all its predicates and auxiliary devices. This vocabulary  includes “rabbit”, “rabbit part”, :rabbit stage”, “formulae”. “number”, “ox”, “cattle”, also two place predicate of identity and difference, and other logical  particles.  In this  terms we can say  in so many  words that this is  a  formular and that a number,  this  a rabbit and that a rabbit part, this and that the same  rabbit and this and that different parts.  In just those words.  This network of terms  and predicates and auxiliary devices is, in relativity jargon, our frame of reference or coordinate system, (Quine 1969:48)

On the   basis of  this Quine states the principle  of ontological  relativity  as follows:  “Reference is nonsense except relative to a coordinate system, (Quine 1969:48).  Apart from this any  asking  of absolute questions about reference is like  asking for absolute velocity  and positions.  We are now to query our conceptualization for reference to their  counterpart conceptualization.

What is  clear about this theory  is that the system created as a coordinate system or frame of reference would need another to refer to.  The  consequence of this  is infinite regress.  To  avoid  this regress Quine suggests that we need a background language.  In this regard we would have to acquiesce in our mother tongue and  take its word  at face value, (Quine 1969:49).  Thus, talks about theories and their Ontologies is meaningful, only relatively  to the background theory, with its own primitively adopted and ultimately inscrutable ontology.

It makes no sense to say what the object of a theory  are, beyond saying how to  interpret or reinterpreted  that theory in another, (Quine 1969:50).  Ontological matters are understandable  relatively  to the background theory. But what there is, is what a theory says there is or what it allows its bound variables to range over.  The querying of reference of a theory is only  relative to the background theory.  The  reference point of one conceptual scheme is another conceptual  scheme, mostly a previous one or a background scheme or language or  theory.

CHAPTER FOUR

BEING AND UNIVERSALS IN QUINEAN ONTOLOGY

1.                 Ontological Commitment

A  convenient starting  point for the discourse of the ontological commitment of a theory is to ask when a theory could be said to assume entities of a given sort.  Quine’s answer to this question  is as follows:

To show that a theory assumes a given  object,  or object of a given class,  we have to show that the theory would  be false if that object did not  exist, or if that class were empty; hence that the theory requires that object, or members of that class, in order to  be true, (Quine 1969:93).

But how are these requirements to be revealed.  Quine answers this again  as follows.

To show that some given  object is required in a theory,  what we have to  show is no more nor less than that the  object is required for the truth of the theory, to be among the values over which the bound variable range, (Quine 1969:94).

Thus,  to be  assumed as an entity is to   be reckoned as the value of a bound variable.  This gives rise to the Quinean   ontological principle that,  “to be is to be the value of a variable”.  This is, however, mathematical.

The actual entities named in the theory are represented either  in predicate terms or names  of individual kinds.  Yet they must all fall within the range of a bound variable.  To discover whether these entities  named in the theory  exist only needs some   reference to the  background theory.

Quine observes that the  formula “to be  is to be the value of a variable” is not itself an ontology but some kind of check of conformity of remarks within an already established  ontology.  The bound variables do not tell us what there is.  They are used to know what an ontology says there is.  So the  question of what actually  there is lingers on.  What kind of ontology can we commit ourselves to?

For Quine,  the best point to  commence the search for what there is, is on the semantic plane.  There are two reasons for this, viz:

1.       to be able to  find a common ground  to argue (ie. common background theory or language or our mother tongue).    Quine believes that the argument of ontology translates upward to semantical controversy  because every ontology is countenanced in words.  Hence, for Quine, there is then no wonder that ontological  controversy should   end in controversy of  language.

2.       All conceptual  schemes of ontology  are matters of language.  The  adoption of  any scheme is a matter of language as it applies in physics.  Ontological  questions  as noted above translate to questions of schemes.  It all depends on what our theory (language) says there is.  The interrogation of our system should not  be done absolutely  but only  relatively  to our background language.   This  reechoes a point made in the  previous chapter that inscrutability of  reference is  not  inscrutability  of fact because there is no  matter of fact.  Again  the questions of ontology are only to be asked of the scheme and relatively to other schemes, within a given  linguistic frame.

Quine argues  that there are two  conceptual schemes within which  our ontology is conceived, namely:  the phenomenalistic and the physicalistic  schemes.  Each of these has its advantage; special  simplicity in its own way, deserve to be developed and is indeed fundamental.  The  one is  epistemological and the other physically fundamental, (Quine cited in Feigl, 1972:553).

The phsysicalistic scheme is simple in its way of ordering the myriad  of our scattered experiences into an ordered whole, such that they are understood as physical objects. But the problem is the  unlikelihood  that physical objects can be translated into phenomenalistic language, which has an epistemological status, compared to the physicalistic  scheme.  On the  whole,   physical objects are called entities which round up and  simplify our account  of the  flux of experience.

In his philosophy Quine shares the tasks of discovering and articulating what there is.  The  physicalistic scheme orders our experience in the mode of fact finding and the  phenomenalistic scheme does the  articulation.  In order to attain  its goal, Quine believes,  that the phenomenalistic, scheme should adopt the  formalistic method of myth  making.  Quine believes that it is only the phenomenalistic  scheme that would  cover the ontology of physics and mathematics.  Viewed from  within  the scheme, physical  and mathematical  objects are myths.  Quine, commits himself to the ontology of mathematical objects because of their  contribution  to the growth of science (especially physics).

Thus, Quine commits himself only to  the ontology of the natural  sciences;  those of physical  and mathematical  objects. He  refuses to recognize the existence of minds, spirits and mental  entities in any sense other than as attribute on  the  part of physical objects mainly persons.  The Quinean reason  for the  restriction  is just to   preserve the close system of the world  as proposed by natural science. So there is no deeper sense of reality  other than the sense in which it is  the business of science in its self corrective hypothetico-deductive method of conceptualization  and experiment to seek the   essence of reality.  Hence,  the  elementary particles, sticks, stones,   numbers, classes – such are the  denotata of terms of  science and the values of its variables.  In  the light of  this commitment, Quine,   strictly refuses to  commit himself to the ontology of entities that are not those of  natural   science.  Thus he  refuses to commit himself to the ontology of universals.  This liberty is consolidated by his new way  of   speaking  by virtue of the theory of description  above, which makes speech possible  without   countenancing any ontology.  This  attitude, appears, however, to be  exceptionally Quinean, even though  he tries to generalize  it.

2.                 Problems of Universals

“This is  question whether there are such  entities as attributes,  relations,  classes, numbers, functions”,  (Quine cited in Feigl, 1972: 549). Quine observes that the  common  sense will say that there are. This again  for him, is the characteristic of the that branch  of metaphysics called ontology.

According  to Quine, however, we  can use singular terms  significantly   in sentences without  presupposing, that there are the entities, which  those terms purport to name.  He argues  further, that we can use general  terms  for example predicates without  conceding them to be names of abstract entities.  We can  equally  view utterances as significant, and as synonymous  or heteronymous with one another without  countenancing a realm  of entities called meanings.  In this  sense nothing  can  commit us to the  ontology of  universals.  The idea of some  common attributes in things could be  expressed  without  the assumption of universals.  For instance, with the  use of bound variables, the  immunity  is sure.  There is something which redhouses, and  redsunset have in common, makes the statement  without reference to  universals.  The difficulties in this view are apparent,  but for our purpose, it is  good to  continue  with the  exposition.  The bound  variables  repudiate the use of the  alleged names.

It is  noteworthy, that Quine  is of the opinion,  that names are all together immaterial. They could be converted to descriptions and Russell  shows,  that the description  could be  eliminated.  Thus,  Quine  opines that,  whatever we say  with the  help of names could be  said  with a language, that shuns names.

So to be  assumed as an  entity  is purely  and simply  to be reckoned as the value  of a variable. Here names are automatically  obviated.

Even when terms include abstract entities,  Quines observes that they do not  have any universal  reference.  As such,  Quine has refused to commit himself to the ontology of universals.  The word ‘refused’ here is very  important  and should be  understood literally .  This personal  decision  in ontological  issues goes against the notion  of the objective pull  which he professes.  A theory  is  committed to the ontology, the entities of which, its bound variables must be  capable of reference in order, that the  affirmation made in the theory  is true.

Whatever kind  of ontology one commits him or herself, has some consequences on mathematics.  The foundational  problem of mathematics manifested the tendency  of a reformulation of the ancient controversy over universals, with emphasis on the range of application of bound  variables. Logicism ended up as some form of  neo-realism, intuitionism as neo-conceptualism and formalism, neo-nominalism.  Thus,  for Quine, the idea of  universals are confusion in ontology caused by the  beard and the confusion   of meaning with reference.  The  rejection  of the view or refusal to be committed to its ontology follows from the  clearing of the confusions.  In his  scheme universals have no  niche.   In this way  Quine  feels that the  clearing of the confusion  associated with the Plato’s beard and that of meaning  and reference has made ontological  commitment free with the use of the bound variables.  It really  aided his treatment and consequent refusal to make commitment to the ontology of universals.  This refusal sounds dogmatic and is not logically founded.  The reason  is that in cases of definitions in  which the variable  are made to range, something different  from the  functional antecedent is understood.  It is the function  which is called  a universal.  To accept the function is to accept a universal.  To accept the one and not  the other is   a contradiction.

3.                 Evaluation

The importance of Quine in the History of Philosophy does not only  lie in  the technical  argument he advances against the analytic-synthetic distinction, but also in a variety  of reactions against the  iconoclastic movement  of logical   positivism.  This doctrine  that every ontology  is found in language,  such that to  ask for knowledge without conceptualization is like asking  for truth without  language was a powerful tool for the Quinean philosophical exploit.

But the overemphasis on language in ontological conception  appears to make  ontology dependent on language, leaving much to be  desired of its clarification.  The indeterminacy of translation, where one expression can be translated into incompatible ones with a concomitant lack of change in the  observed fact is in want of explanation too.  It has at once made nonsense of radical  translation and synonymy  of expressions.  The solution  given to the  problem of indeterminacy is very  unsatisfactory.   It is  difficult to hold on to an absolute indeterminacy  of language except one is ready to accept the possibility  of private language.  But such acceptance  in the  Quinean context would contradict his view of language as a social art.  Given this view and the possibility of children’s language acquisition then how is absolute indeterminacy of translation possible?

Although, Quine, repudiates the dogmatism of empiricism, his ontological  views are dogmatic because they are set to preserve the close system  of the  natural science, which are themselves  dogmatic.  Quine’s dogmatism  surfaces again,  when he refuses to  believe in Homer’s god on the grounds that it is  not  consistent with his empiricist worldview.  The  conclusion that could  follow from  this is, that if Quine  did not  commit himself to the  physicalistic scheme,  he would  have held  the same  views with Homer.  In this case therefore, the system survives at the  expense of truth.  Little  wonder then,  why  Quine  continually   emphasizes on myth making  as the duty of mathematics and physics.  Thus, in  the final analysis, all the objects to which he makes his ontological  commitment  would  be sheer myths and actually,  they are.

Quine’s rejection of mentality with the corresponding position of physicalism  is extremely  materialistic.  The consequences of this are enormous.  There is therefore in Quine’s worldview, determinism, absence of freedom of the will, when he discovers that his purpose is  consistency with scientific  progress and not  conviction of truth.  The situation is  even more sympathetic, because reference,  meaning and translation are indeterminate except with respect to some  uncritically chosen basis.  The basis is chosen  to avoid regress.  Here truth  has no firm foundation except an arbitrary one.

Quine’s total  rejection of the notion  of universals with a corresponding invention of a way of avoiding such manner of speaking  is not consistent with  his adoption of objects of mathematics as part of the range of his bound variables.   The History of Philosophy reveals  two forms  of universals, namely the predicate and the formal  universals.  The first pertains to singular and general  terms  and the second to mathematical entities.  Thus, the acceptance of  one as one with physical  objects with a corresponding rejection of the other is inconsistent with traditional  worldview.  If the one is of a piece with science, the  other is of a piece with ordinary language.  So if ordinary language communicates reality, it  then  means that these universals which are of a piece with them have their use in such  communications.  This then makes their  rejection  desirous of a more solid basis.  But the  most astonishing aspect of  Quine’s rejection of universals is that it is done simply  on the basis that he does  not want to commit himself to o the ontology  of universals.  Thus,  non of his bound  variable  should refer to that range of things  at all.  In short, his is a close system, as he rightly  characterizes it and  dogmatic.  He has made it so and we desire some more sound basis,  consistency and unaffected sincerity.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE RELEVANCE OF QUINE’S PHILOSOPHY TO AFRICAN  PHILOSOPHY

1.                 Quine and African  Philosophy

Contemporary  works in African  Philosophy are characterized by views concerning either the possibility  of African  Philosophy  or the idea of African philosophy.  The  former serves as an answer to Western doubt of the possibility of African philosophy, whereas the latter is about what philosophy is and what should be the  preoccupations of African Philosophy.  To this questions diverse answers have been  advanced.  But such are not  within  the scope  of this  task.  This view is however brought here because of the assumption, that every discourse in African  Philosophy  should  begin with  them.  This view is  held by people  who seek to find  a foundation for African  Philosophy. For  Wiredu,  African  Philosophy  is in the making.  Paul  Hountondji believes that the goal of philosophy  in African  is to know what philosophy  is and what it can do. Following this view is the emphasis on the  relevance of Philosophy  to the  African solution.  Msgr.  T. S.  Okere, prescribes that this  feat could be  achieved  first by  the application of the Western  Philosophical theories to the African  situation.  Second, by studying the African situation and interpreting it philosophically.

To the first we now  begin with Quine’s philosophy.  When   viewed from the point of view of its relevance to African  Philosophy, Quine’s philosophy  could be  said to have a disagreeing and a contributive effect.

In disagreement  to African  philosophical  worldview the Quinean philosophy posits a purely  materialistic worldview.  This disagrees with the African worldview as they  appear  in the works of such authors like  Mbiti and  other traditional African Philosophers.  This  materialism, denies the reality  of a  dualistic existence of man which  is at the  foundation of African  belief systems.  For the  African, man is a being with body  and soul.  But for Quine, it is the  material and no other. Some African Philosophers have argued extensively in  support of the view,  that freedom, is the  common  character of all  cultures. But unfortunately , the conclusion of Quine’s materialistic philosophy  will be  deterministic.  Quine, however, refuses  to accept determinism, which  is consistent with his  scheme and posits freedom  of the will.  But the  will for him still has a cause to will as it does. (Quine, 1978) So, his scheme is yet deterministic.  This determinism has even enjoyed an unfounded personal  ontological  delimitation.   The project of controlled  speech developed by Quine above  does not permit the principle  of scientific openness to be operative  in the ontology.  This  lack of  openness  does not  go contrary to African  social-psychological outlook of embrace (Senghor 1975), it equally does not permit its  consequent complementary ontology and epistemology (Cf Asouzu 2004).  Thus, the African  philosophical evaluation of the Quinean hypothesis would be that it represents negatively, a continuation of the propagation  of the programme of fragmentation, preference, favouritism, discrimination and unfounded specification in social   and ontological  concerns.  This kind of fragmentation  and selfish intensionality is  responsible for a great deal of setbacks in cognitive research.

The Quinean system  could  contribute to one of the  arguments in  African Philosophy  concerning the relativism  and the universality of  cultures.  With  Quine,   there is  relativism.  But  against  is position cultural  universals  would  be  some real  existent. It will  make sense to accept cultural  universals because the basis of the acceptance of the objects of mathematics is pragmatism, as Quine  opines.  Thus,  it seems reasonable  that cultural  universals are at par with mathematical objects.  The former are of pragmatic value to the  cultural anthropologist  and should  be accepted as real entities. But I think  that Quine  would  kick against it because of his sheer refusal  to commit himself to the ontology  of universal  entities, even  though  he has made such  commitment  already  in mathematics.

Quines conviction that an ontological  question  translates into question regarding  the schemes  can be  of encouragement to the  traditionalist project.  For the traditionalist, the  preoccupation of African Philosophy should  be the study  of African belief  systems, folklores and idioms, and within them would  be  found the people’s philosophy.

Quine’s argument analytic – synthetic distinction  can serve to clear the traditionalist’s distinction  between  the European  mode of thinking  and the African mode of thinking.  This confusion  was  introduced into the  African  philosophical world  in 1976 by Senghor.  According  to him the Europeans think analytically where as the Africans think intuitively  and participate in the objects, Senghor (cited in Oladipo, 1998:84).  When closely  observed it means  that the  African  thinks synthetically with objects of reference  in immediate experience.  The problem  with this  philosophical orientation  was an attempt to show the difference between the African and the European.  But I think that Quine’s argument can help to refute that.  No people  think so  distinctly  synthetic or analytic because of some  similarities of experiences as well as rational and pragmatic foundations. 

2.                 Conclusion

The bulk of Quine’s ontological  system  lies on the  belief that a clear understanding of the theories of  meaning and reference and their correct application in ontological discourse holds the key  to  sound  ontological formulations.  And his system is founded on the  confidence that he has captured the correct view of these concepts.  To evaluate him is to evacuate his presumption.

WORK CITED

Asougu, I. I. (2004), The Method  and Principles of Complementary  Reflection  in And  Beyond African Philosophy.

Carnap, R. (1972), Meaning And Necessity: published in New Readings in Philosophical  Analysis by Feigl, H. et al, New York:  Meredith Corporation. (Pp. 110 – 115).

____________   Meaning  Postulates;  published in New Readings  in Philosophical  Analysis by Feigl, H. et al, New York: Meredith Corporation (pp.173 – 180),

Quine, W. N. (1969), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays New York:  Columbia University Press.

Quine, W. V. (1971), From  A Logical  Point  of View; Massachusetts: Harvard  University Press.

Quine, W. V. (1972), Carnap And Logical Truth:  published in Feigl, H., et al, New Readings in Philosophical Analysis New York: Meredith Corporation, (Pp 95 – 110).

Quine, W. V. (1972), On Carnap’s View on Ontology: Published in Feigl, H., et al, New Readings  in Philosophical  Analysis New York: Meredith Corporation, (pp 597-601)

Quine, W. V. (1972), Two Dogmas of  Empiricism;  published in Feigl, H., et al, New Readings  in Philosophical  Analysis New York: Meredith Corporation, (pp 81-94).

Quine W. V. (1972)  On What There Is: published in Feigl, H., et al, New Readings  in Philosophical  Analysis New York: Meredith Corporation, (pp 545 - 554)

Quine, W. V. (1972)  Ontology and Ideology, Published in Feigl, H., et al, New Readings  in Philosophical  Analysis New York: Meredith Corporation, (pp 558 – 567).

Senghor, L. (1975), On African Socialism, New York: Frederic  A Praeger Pub.

Sogolo Godwin (1993), Foundation of African Philosophy, A Definite Analysis of Continental Issues in African Thought, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press