KANT’S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: A PRINCIPLE FOR DEMOCRATIC

GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA.

BY

JOHN OFEM INYANG

TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                                                                    PAGES

Certification  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           ii

Declaration   -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           iii

Acknowledgement- -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           iv-v

Abstract          -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           vi-vii

Table of Contents    -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           viii-x

1.0   CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY ... 1

1.1    Introduction     -           -           -           -           -           -           -           1-6

1.2    Statement of the Problem     -           -           -           -           -           6-9

1.3    Objectives of the Study         -           -           -           -           -           -           9 -10

         1.4    Significance of the Study        --          -           -           -           -           10

         1.5    Justification of the Study         -           -           -           -           -       11 -12

         1.6    Method of the Study     -           -           -           -           -           -           12

1.7    Scope of the Study    -           -           -           -           -           -        12-13

1.8         Organization of the Study.            -           -           -           -           -        13-15

2.0 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW      -         -           -           -        16-58

3.0 CHAPTER THREE: AN EXEGESIS OF THECATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE... 59

 

3.1. Early Life and Backgrounds of Immanuel Kant      -           -       59 - 66

         3.2. An Over-View of Kant’s Ethics -           -           -           -           -           66-70

                  3.2.1 Deontological Ethics       -           -           -           -           -      70-76     

3.2.2 Kant’s Rejection of Naturalistic Ethics       -           -     76-78       

3.2.3 Kant’s Rejection of Teleological Ethics     -           -     78-81

3.2.4 The Historical Antecedents of the Categorical

          Imperative -     -           -           -           -           -           -      81-86

 

         3.3. The Nature of the Categorical Imperative as a Moral Law... 86-94  

 

         3.3.1. The Source of the Moral Law             -           -           -    95 -98

     3.3.2. The Autonomy of the Will     -           -           -           -    98-101

3.3.3.   The Good Will, Duty/Obligation    -           -           -    101-108

                   3.3.4. The Concept of Humanity in Kant’s Ethics-  -    108-111

3.4         The Principles of Universalizability as a Test for Moral Action.. 111

 

               3.4.1The Kingdom of Ends   -           -           -           -               113-115

        3.4.2 The Kantian Postulates/Formulations for Morality-           115-118

         3.4.3 The Hypothetical Imperative         -           -           -                119-120   

                     3.4.4 The Heteronomy of the Will.   -           -              121 - 122

  4.0 CHAPTER FOUR: THE NATURE OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA -           ---  ---  ---  ---  -- --  123          

 

   4.1 The Nigerian Historical Reflection -           -           -             123 -131

   4.2 The Basic Assumptions of Democracy.     -           -              131-137

4.3 Democracy in Nigeria since Independence and Political Leadership           Experience         -   -        - -- --- ----   ----    ---- ----   --   137-143

 

          4.4 A Moral Review of Democratic Governance in Nigeria. .. 144-148

 

             4.4.1   Demarcating Between Public and Private Morality…148-169

 

              4.4.2 Ruthlessness in Public Life           -           -             169-178      

                       4.4.3 Politics and Moral Character.            -           -             178-186

5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA. -           - 187

 

 5.1 The Categorical Imperative and Right Leadership. -            193-199

 5.2 The Categorical Imperative and Democratic Ideals   199-200

  5.2.1 Justice                  -           -           -           -           -           -           200-204

        5.2.2 Freedom     -           -           -           -           -           -           205-210

         5.2.3 Equality      -           -           -           -           -           -           211-215

5.3 The Categorical Imperative and Human Interest-       -           216-223

6.0 CHAPTER SIX: RECOMMEMDATIONS, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.                                                   -  -           -           224

6.1 The Concept of Complementarity and the Institutionalization of the

Categorical Imperative as Indices for Democratic Governance in Nigeria 225-232

                          

  6.2   Summary           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           233-235

  6.3   Conclusion        -           -           -           -           -           -           -           235-240

         * WORKS CITED        -           -           -           -           -           -           241-250

 

 

6.1         The Concept of Complementarity and the Institutionalization of Kant’s Categorical Imperative as Indices for Democratic Governance in Nigeria

 

The idea of complementarity as presented by Asouzu focuses on the integration of all the various components that constitutes a system with a view to working harmoniously so as to achieve a common goal or good. Once the components of a system function at variance and in a disintegrative manner, the result obviously will be chaos. It is in this sense that I recommend the theory of complementarity as a drive toward harmonizing all democratic structures or components. In this vein democracy as a system of governance can only work when each of the diverse units of the system serve as a missing link complementarily and authentically.  This implies that each component is highly valued as being indispensable and a requirement for harmonious relations. The moment the components are viewed in isolation and are in disregard to each other then, it is possible for a unit to be unaware of the other. The very unit that is unaware of by other units that constitute the system is what Asouzu described as ‘missing link’ of the whole system.

Furthermore, Asouzu avers that “conceptualized as a system, all the units have to be brought together in relation to each other towards becoming mutually aware of each other” (59). It is in this respect that the missing link is conceived, as not only vital but also indispensable if the system must work. In this connection, no unit or component of democracy as a system is considered as an instrument or a means rather, it is considered as an intrinsic value of the entire system. Simply put, the cardinal point of emphasis of the theory of complementarity is the harmonious relationship or the integration of all efforts for a common good. The relevance of this point cannot be over-emphasized. According to Asouzu, the mind-set of complementarity reveals that, the “meaning attached to any given action (human) goes far beyond their immediate expression to a wider network of relations” (76). Critically this consciously calls for Kant’s idea of universalizing our actions by de-emphasizing individuality or self interest as a purpose or impulse of our actions. Instead duty or obligation should be considered as primarily significant, which in his conception is determined rationally.

Though Kant de-emphasized teleological actions in a society of rational beings, the principle of complementarity in the practical sense can create avenue for the accomplishment of the tenets of the categorical imperative. This is because it is more realistic and possible for complementarity to take place among rational beings in a society than the various formulations of the categorical imperative. In other words the moment there is a higher level of integration, universalizing our actions and treating every man as an end in him can simply be attained because complementarity had already paved the way. This is unlike the case of a utopian concept.

Democratically, the moral law considered being free from material inclinations, impulse or any pre-determination of our actions as conceived by Kant enables the attainment of democratic ideals like justice, equality, fairness, virtue and practical freedom. This is because the actions are often geared towards meeting the overall needs of the people described as the common good as against personal needs. Social actions derived on personal interest can easily lead to slavery, subjugation of fellow human beings, ethnicity, tribalism, inhumanity, exploitation, corruption, and other anti-democratic indices especially according to Asouzu in keeping with ”human tendency to seek one’s interests first most especially in asymmetrical situations” (65). Since the moral law depersonalizes our actions, it enables freedom from any kind of inclination. In concrete situation, the moral law appears utopia given that man naturally is self-preservative. However to further attain this preservation, there is need to live in a society where every member aims at protecting the interest of all by universalizing and at the same time complementing every action for the good of all. To buttress this point Asouzu avers that “the underlying interest in dealing with most complex situations that involve differences and similarities is the fundamental human instinct for self preservation” (65). This further suggests that the complex democratic governance in Nigeria can rightly be attributed to the tendency for self-preservation.

Suffice it to say that the theory of complementarity gives the moral law and the categorical imperative as a whole the drive for economic, political, social and moral reforms and a reversal of the status quo in Nigerian democratic governance. In this connection, Asouzu writing on the ‘concretization of complementarism in action’, explains that complementarism is more about those actions we can take to make the system work or about those things that brings good and positive changes in the lives of the individuals and society. It offers the framework for mutual enrichment towards ushering in systematic transformation. It is hoped that the harmonious/mutual dependence of complementarity will enable the optimal realization of the gains of democratic governance in Nigeria and serve as a vital force for the institutionalization of the categorical imperative highly needed for the growth and internal changes of a sick system like that of Nigeria.

Once the authentic interest of democratic system is identified through both complementary and categorical imperatives, there is likely to be a perceptive reinforcement of the individual components towards sustaining the optimal life span of the system further and this therefore implies democratic stability. This authentic interest is the common good and is the primary goal of every democratic governance, which is fundamentally structured on morality and the categorical imperative in particular. Suffice it to state emphatically that the major essential role of the complementary relationship in actualizing the various formulations and tenets of the categorical imperative is to enable a fundamental and genuine fellow feeling, which reinvigorates and sustains the system. It practically eliminates self-interest already conceived as an impediment to attaining the common good and other democratic ideals. Thus the wills and actions of each individual that comprises the system must be integrated by way of linking with each other consciously and systematically as indispensable components of the whole. In other words the Nigeria society fundamentally is in strong need of all our actions in the universalized sense to be consistently subjugated to the insights of the theory of complementarism. Asouzu in this connection posits that, this task equally subsists in harnessing all good wills and putting them into action (61). Apparently the moment the various wills that makes the Nigeria society are consciously brought together in the most harmonious way then, democracy as a system of governance in Nigeria is likely to uphold the authentic foundation of human interest talking about the common good.

Asouzu further notes that “the process that enters into the formulation of a system cannot make a harmonious whole where each component dose not perform the functions for which it is ordained” (59). This may not analogically be different from Plato’s tripartite elements of the human soul working harmoniously upon performing discrete functions. Connecting the theory of complementarity with the categorical imperative, one can assert that once all human wills are founded on the principles of universalizability and are integrated as an authentic relation, then the result would be a well ordered system aimed at a common purpose. This apparently is a major feature of democratic governance, which ostensibly Nigeria can attain, when put in place. Thus the authentic legitimization of every individual in Nigeria is reached when each is viewed as a missing link of the entity called Nigeria.

Thus whatever a person does in life, his action serves one way or the other as a missing link of reality making such action indispensable and directed towards the common good. In other words our system can work only when the diverse components that constitute it serve each other complementarily and authentically as aspects of a missing link. Suffice it to say that the principles of complementarity and the categorical imperative can be used as higher principles of integration to redress contextually the weaknesses of democracy in Nigeria.

Significantly, the success of democratic governance in Nigeria depends on the categorical imperative as its foundation and practically, requires a complementary correlation of all actions. This will not only practically eliminate corruption, individualism or self interest, ethnicity, human exploitation and denigration, subjugation and conquest, religious crisis, unbridled quest for economic gains, extreme form of pathological superiority complexes and other democratic impediments, but will result in the realization and sustenance of democratic ideals such as equality, justice, freedom and fairness which Nigeria is in dire need as a democratic nation. It will also bring about the prevalence of the common good at the centre stage. As part of the process of realizing these ideals, both political leaders and followers should by orientation, imbibe the principle of universalizability. The leadership style should not be predicated on divisive and exploitative tendencies. In this connection therefore leadership and in general human action would mean the unification of all human interests towards the determination of the common goals of the society. Anything contrary is therefore a farce or charade in the face of democracy.

The moment a society acquires a complementary attitude to life, it naturally and easily spreads to all facets of its existence including the institutions that makes part of the society. Thus it is recommended that to institutionalize the categorical imperative in order to bring about the attainment of basic democratic ideals in Nigeria, will entail a new moral orientation in our socio-political and economic life style and a general attitudinal change. Such orientation and attitudinal change should portray certain insightful needs of why men live in society. These include the fact that without society, human dignity inherent in democracy as an ideology cannot be accomplished. Importantly, reason requires development through character, training, education and the complement of other members of the society in order to attain all the democratic ideals. As part of the orientation, it should be inculcated in the Nigerian citizenry that, according to Ene and Okolo “…not just self exists in the society but others as well. One needs all as much as all need one for the society to achieve common goals” (56). In other words Gerwirth expresses that, men in a complementary manner come together to have social rights and duties towards one another insofar as they can mutually help to fulfill one another’s basic needs (10). Apparently, people complementarily live in society to help, not to prey on the society and one another, cooperate with not exploit nor ruin one another, and for the maximum good of all.

Both principles of categorical imperative and complementarity take shape in the human personality just as democracy and its ideals are human based. This obviously captures the above point which would have to be introduced largely as part of our political education or general educational curriculum especially as moral instructions at all levels of education both formal and informal. Religious sects, social, economic, political, military, cultural and traditional life style of the people would require injecting in the moral tenets of the categorical imperative and complementarity targeted at the common good as a standard for measuring democratic success and stability.

 

6.2       Summary

A cursory reflection on this dissertation rightly points out the major problems of democracy as it is practiced in Nigeria which in a nut-shell, is fundamentally attributed to the declining state of morality, resulting in the collapse of democratic structures or values such as welfare, freedom, equality, justice and fairness. Besides the decline in moral values and national consciousness in both public and private lives, there is a pathological tendency that is centered on selfishness, ethnicity and the like. Thus self-preservation a natural phenomenon is noted as a fundamental instinct that underlies the differences in social lives and as a catalyst for moral decadence. As a major determinant factor of human action, this phenomenon has in it, the notion of “the nearer the better and the safer”. This is considered as an explicative index of self-centeredness where both corrupt leaders and followers of the system prefer to create wealth only around themselves, their families and close associates. Thus all social actions motivated by something extrinsic have been described in this work as teleological as against deontological or hypothetical as against categorical.

            It can be asserted that Immanuel Kant in his work Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) basically identified teleological or hypothetical actions as lacking morality, duty and obligation. In summation, such actions are taken not because they are good but because of the desired or expected ends. They are therefore not ends in themselves but means to ends. For Kant, a hypothetical action cannot serve man morally and socially instead it is self seeking and is taken based on certain inclinations to empirical or material things and not based on rationality or pure reasoning devoid of external influence. Thus Kant’s idea of the categorical imperative is used to describe actions derived from reasoning and devoid of any external influence that is, influence outside itself. Such actions for him have the features of duty and obligation hence, could serve as a command for all rational human beings. To attain such a command, the action is judged by the principle of universalizability where one imagines himself and others as rational human beings facing similar situations thereby allowing conscience to determine the veracity or rightness of an action as it affects them indiscriminately.

It has been discovered in this work that for the basic pillars of democracy like justice, equality, freedom, and fairness to be put in place in a country like Nigeria already bedeviled with anti-democratic vices, morality both in the public and private spheres must be laid as the foundation on which every other social, economic, and political structure must be constructed. In order to make it situational or practicable and not utopian, it is argued in this study, and as a form of recommendation, that Asouzu’s theory of complementarity which is focused on a higher form of integration, can be used to redress the weakness in Nigeria democratic governance especially in harnessing all the various units or components as well as good wills required for the system to work. This would pave way for the fundamental tenets of the categorical imperative to be laid as the foundation of democracy. Since the categorical imperative is derived from rationality, it is undoubtedly human related and for any human society to thrive democratically, the tenets of the categorical imperative as posited by Kant need be institutionalized in all facets of life including our social, economic, political, cultural, religious, military and educational institutions which in a way are missing links of democratic governance.

 To institutionalize these tenets, a pedagogical approach is required whether formally or informally as a process of character formation, transformation and attitudinal change. It is on this basis that we draw the bottom line that democratic governance in Nigeria can thrive and be sustained when all and sundry adopts the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant and as a moral foundation for the construction of socio-economic and political structures and the actualization of democratic ideals such as justice, equality, freedom and fairness.

 

6.3       Conclusion

It is important to note that in all, Kant’s ethics fundamentally highlights and respects the dignity and equality of human beings without presupposing theological claims or metaphysical conception of the common good, which obviously is at the centre of democracy as a system of governance. Human dignity, freedom, justice and equality in Kant’s categorical imperative cannot be compromised given that they form the essence of man and are equally the fundamental pillars of democracy. Kant’s categorical imperative if imbibed and institutionalized as recommended will definitely bring about a total transformation of the citizenry and impact attitudinal changes to life given that every of our action will be duty bound. With this in place, democracy will obviously be sustained as a system of governance and both the leader and the followers would be detached from selfish interest or pathological tendencies as an impulse of action and every action taken would be by implication for the benefit of all.

Obviously, Kant’s systematic and critical philosophy rests on an account of reasoning about action and this justifies the principles of duty and virtue. It creates room for a liberal and republican conception of justice with cosmopolitan scope and an account of the relationship between morality and hope. The relevance of Kant’s ethical philosophy can be traced to his observation that, as human beings we lack a substantive account of the good especially where we do not take into consideration a strong view of the equality of moral agents and the importance of universal principles of duty, which spells out what it is to respect fellow human beings (freedom), thereby accounting for justice and rights in the society. Stressing this, all particular ends for Kant, must systematically be subsumable into the ‘’whole of all ends’’ in a complementary manner. Thus if the form of one’s action is not part of an effort to create a well formed totality, it becomes difficult to describe such action as a morally correct conduct. In this case, complementarity contradicts self interest.

Critically, the implications of Kant’s categorical imperative are of course far-reaching and if taken seriously would require radical re-adjustments in our choices and style of living. Even within the conception of the private sphere of life, Kant’s categorical imperative has a direct bearing on it given that, if the private ends have the moral significance ascribed to them in this Kantian interpretation, then one’s choice of a private end, cannot be the kind of intensely personal question that should only be taken up by the rational rugged individualist. In another vein, because the ideal of social relation is organic in character, and the forms of private end either are or are not adapted to the social ideal, one’s choice of a private end or abandonment of a private end becomes a social question that deserves moral scrutiny. In addition, private ends should undergo constant adjustment and improvement in accordance with the ideal of human (organic) society.

The absolute and universal horizon for Kant could mean the complete development of human capacities and the attainment of moral goals. In this connection, a private or particular and conditional horizon implies any level of development short of the absolute limit to human achievement. This study wish to strongly assert that the development of any nation Nigeria inclusive entails the development of persons. The immorality of its citizens is the greatest and most formidable obstacle to national development. Since morality is rooted in human nature, any disposition to the contrary is a logical negation and contradiction in nature. For democracy to thrive therefore in a nation of moral decadence is not only absurd but also chimerical because human society is structured on moral principles as its foundation hence, the categorical imperative should be injected pedagogically into our political, economic, social, religious, educational, military and cultural spheres of life. Significantly democracy is to be understood not as a means to the realization of values but as itself their realization. In this case, it is not perceived as an instrument or method since the instrumentalist eschews values; rather democracy in relation to Kant’s categorical imperative is itself an intrinsic value. Berry rightly noted that, democracy alone accords with dignity, equality, freedom and justice, which all social institutions embody (57). 

Omoragbe in Dukor opines that, ‘’without morality there can be no democracy. Democracy will degenerate into barbarism and dictatorship’’ (383). This suggests that, the moral foundation of the state is what determines its capacity to express the common good, which is an index of democratic governance. This further suggests that, it is impossible to detach morality from democracy. However, we need be reminded that the struggle for leadership in Nigeria shows in clear terms that conscience, morality and ethical values have given way to personal interest. It is obvious that the prerogative of power, in spite of its intricacies, makes those involved in the pursuit of power to adopt any possible and practicable technique to achieve their ambition. To buttress this point, our greatest undoing is having no regard for morality, especially when it comes to politics and the struggle for leadership. No one needs to argue that if morality is imbibed in politics, the former will not only lay a strong base, but also go a long way to promote our democratic values. 

With the aid of complementary reflection inquiring into the conditions that favours successful co-existence of peoples in society, the place of the imperative in democratic stability is according to Osaghae in the final analysis to establish a government only to the extent that the people believe it has a moral right to be obeyed. An immoral milieu in government debilitates the effectiveness of the state as it renders it incapable of enforcing its policies (73). Thus the principles of complementarity will guide against persons seeking actions that would serve their private ends or that of a particular group. Instead it would uphold and consolidate holistic ends aimed at delivering the common good. Political leadership style in the case of Nigeria would have to be characterized by universality and totality. It would no longer be predicated on divisive and exploitative tendencies or antecedents rather it would aim at a unification of all human interests and actions towards attaining the common good.

Finally, to talk about Kant’s politics and ethics shows that, there is a correlation between these two realms of life and it is from this notion that I have used the ‘categorical imperative’ as a solid foundation on which a stable democratic governance in Nigeria can be constructed. Though Kant’s notion of the ‘kingdom of end’ is idealistic, the practical or situational adoption of the theory of complementarity makes it more realistic. In this sense, Asouzu states that it “brings out the best in the individual who feels not only for himself but for others who are a part and an extension of his personality” (72). Thus the idea of establishing an ideal democratic society in Nigeria is drawn largely from the notions of complementarity and the ‘kingdom of ends’ which when critically evaluated are not only morally binding but also have the element of the rule of law as a veritable instrument and feature of democracy.        

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