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Complementary Reflection, African Philosophy and General Issues in Philosophy |
Innocent
Asouzu’s Approach to African Philosophy
and the
Context of Other Interpretations
In the
following remarks I want to give a critical review of the book The Method
and Principles of Complementary Reflection in and beyond African Philosophy,
written by Innocent Izuchukwu Asouzu, a Catholic priest and Professor of
Philosophy at the University of Calabar in the Igbo-region of Nigeria. This
book has first been published in July 2004 with Calabar University Press and
republished in 2005 as volume 4 of the series ‘Studies in African Philosophy’
with LIT-Verlag at Münster in
In his book Asouzu presents a fresh approach to
African philosophy, which has an incisive impact on the discussions about this
particular kind of philosophy. First of all it is underlined that African
philosophy has to be regarded as philosophy precisely in the same way as the
philosophies of any other region of the world: ‘Arab philosophy, Greek philosophy,
Asian philosophy, Indian philosophy, Japanese philosophy … American philosophy,
European philosophy’ and other philosophies. (52) The specificity of African
philosophy, with its primarily oral practice and tradition and its particular
cultural ambience, is worked out by Asouzu from the perspective of the Igbo
community. He comes to generalisations, which are valid for the big majority of
peoples living in
The special conditions of partly nomadic living
peoples in
In Azouzu’s
book complementary reflection has mainly three different aspects. Firstly,
there is ‘ontological complementarity’. Reality is regarded as an all-embracing
whole, in which all units form together a dynamic play of forces, which are in
harmony with each other, by completing and supporting one another. The harmony
of this play of forces does not exist without dangers, but it can maintain its
balance against the influence of counter-forces, which try to disturb or
undermine it. ‘The worldview of the traditional African shows, in a very
natural way, strong moment[s] of the transcendent ontological categories of
unity, totality, universality, comprehensiveness, wholeness and future referentiality
as authentic dimensions of thoroughgoing complementarism’. (150)
Secondly, complementarity can be found in society.
What is true for the units of reality as a whole is also and in a more
conscious manner valid for the members of society. They do not leave alone
somebody, who is in danger or in need, but in the family or in the larger
community, which is regarded as an ‘extended family’, this person will find
support. There are limits to this kind
of harmony between human beings in society. Envy and hatred between them do
occur, even sacrifice of human beings are real sometimes and somewhere.
Personal interest and the personal existential situation are the causes of
these limits. However, completing and supporting one another is and remains the
main attitude of the members of African societies, so that the principle of
‘caring is sharing’ forms the predominant feature of them. The ant is the
example of strength by cooperation and mutual support, as it is expressed in
the ‘Igbo work song’, in which the following verse is repeated many times:
‘Bunu bunu oo ibu anyi danda’ (‘Lift the load, lift the load, nothing is
impossible for the ant’). (118)
Thirdly, ‘personal complementarity’ is taken into
consideration. Every person represents this paradigm because his or her
permanent and transcendent flow of consciousness connects the present life to
the former life of the ancestors and to the own afterlife in the land of
spirits. Thus the understanding of reality and all its different units turns
out to transcend
personal life by embedding it into a spiritual whole of a cosmic
process, which develops in time and space. To every person the possibility is
offered that he or she can participate in what is called in the Igbo-language:
‘Jide ka iji’ (‘Joy of being’), which permeates the cosmos as a whole, society
with its structure of extended families, and personal life. (148) When a person
is referred to by ‘using the impersonal pronoun it’, this gives expression to
the fact that one is speaking of the human being in its totality that ‘can
never be conceptualised in a fragmented mode, but as complementary units that
form a whole’. (159)
The ‘complementary approach to reality’ is not exactly
‘anthropocentric or human-centred’ as it is sometimes described. Ontologically
it is ‘rather comprehensive’: ‘to be is to be in a relationship of mutual
joyous complementary service’. (156/7) There is a special accent on being part
of the community, and certain metaphysical and mythological ideas about the
influence of the spirits occur in the worldview of African people. Also a
misuse of these ideas for ‘ideological manipulation’ cannot be denied.
Nevertheless the ‘theoretical technical reason’ of the African mindset and also
a widespread pragmatic attitude in solving everyday problems have
to be argued for.
Asouzu knows about complementary
reflection from his own personal history and experience as a member of a family
within the Igbo people. In the Section ‘Dedication and Acknowledgement’ the reader
gets thoroughly informed about this personal background. Asouzu participates in
this particular knowledge by learning from his ancestors and from the fellow
members of his people and also by listening to his language, especially to
proverbs, sayings or maxims. This knowledge is spread in the society as a
whole. Nevertheless it is concentrated in persons like himself,
summarising and critically evaluating what is handed down and communicated to
them. These persons can be elders, office bearers, priests, healers or ordinary
people. At any rate, it can be attributed to certain individuals in the present
situation and in the history of the Igbo community, although Asouzu does not
and/or cannot give their names. In this sense, he speaks about ‘the anonymous
Igbo philosopher’. (142-148, passim) The ‘experience of transcendent
complementary unity of consciousness joins’ this thinker ‘to his milieu’. This
can be regarded as an advantage. For, ‘the thinker and his environment
reinforced themselves mutually’. On the other hand must be admitted: ‘Due to
the symbiotic relationship between the ideas of these thinkers and their
environment, their thoughts did not attain the level of refinement, freshness
and dynamism it would (or could) otherwise have attained’. (212; addition in
the quotation between brackets by me, HK)
By the reformulation of the method and
principles of complementary reflection Asouzu tries to avoid the limits and the
negative aspects of the teachings of the anonymous Igbo philosopher. In respect
of the ‘ontological reflection’ the conditions for overcoming the negative
forces in the world and for stabilising harmony are sorted out. This kind of
reflection includes a certain type of logic, which ‘seeks to explore missing
links in a comprehensive, total and universal’ way of thought. Thus ‘it
presupposes the acquisition of an inclusive comprehensive logical mindset as
opposed to a disjunctive logical mindset’. (355) And it has an impact on the
‘ethical reflection’, which is not only related to the questions of right or
wrong, but also to those of beauty and ugliness in an aesthetic sense (369),
and to the ‘the joy and sadness of human action’, as they are incorporated in
the joyful being of cosmic and natural harmony. (361) Above all, this ontology has
a religious foundation. For, ‘the ontological joy of being is transcendent in
the sense that it is something that has to do with the foundation of our being
outside ourselves’ in the land of spirits. In connection with that, ‘the search
for this ultimate foundation of our existence takes very concrete and acute
shape in religious experiences where this one true, absolute, and transcendent
being is clearly identified in different cultures under diverse names. Some of
these names are Chukwu, God, Mu’umba, Udali …Olodumare, Onyankupon … Allah,
Yahwe’ and others. (438/9)
It is a remarkable contribution to the
history and the specific problems of philosophy in the Western world that
complementary reflection leads to a possibility of ‘overcoming the subject-object
dichotomy’. It turns out not to be adequate to ‘raise a thoroughgoing
subjectivism’ or ‘a thoroughgoing objectivism’ to ‘a universal methodological
principle’. On the one hand, scepticism and relativism, which undermine every
true statement, would follow from that. And on the other hand dogmatism and
imposed orthodoxy could not be avoided. In the way of thought, which is
suggested by Asouzu, ‘we see how a transcendent complementary unity of
consciousness belongs to the same region as (or is in correspondence with) the
transcendent categories of being’. (474-481; addition in the quotation between
brackets by me, HK)
Not all dimensions of complementary
reflection can be reviewed here. In a final analysis Asouzu comes back to a
perspective of the first part of his book: the ‘African paradigm’ forms an
answer to the ‘global imperative’ of political peacekeeping and social justice.
The promise of a New World Order can become true by using complementary
reflection instead of thinking in oppositions and in terms of friend and enemy.
(51-60) In the ‘new global family’ nobody ‘can be
understood without reference to other members of the family’. And everybody has
the right to be helped in a situation of danger or of need. The ‘differences in
age, in sex, in nationality, in religion, in language, in ethnicity, in tribe,
in race, in culture, in ideologies’ are expressions of a multidimensional
reality. They can and must be seen as enrichment for each other in ‘building a
viable and meaningful human family’. (481/2)
In his Preface to Asouzu’s book, Obi
Oguejiofor from the Seminary at
Nevertheless
I am of opinion that his approach becomes clearer and more concrete, that it
gets sharper contours, if it is embedded into the context of other
interpretations of African philosophy. Of course, in certain connections Asouzu
is in discussion with other African and non-African philosophers. He is
referring especially to well known and also to less famous Nigerian thinkers
and theorists, more in particular from Igboland. References to Achebe,
Bodunrin, Eboh, Eze,
Okolo, Serequeberhan, Sodipo or Unah are important and often
enlightening, those to Aligwekwe, Arazu, Iwe, Okadigbo, Ugorji or Uwalaka add
something to the list of authors, who have already been quoted in many other
books on African philosophy. From the Nigerian environment I miss names as
Gbadegesin, Oluwole or Momoh. Absolutely essential contributions to African philosophy
as those of Senghor, Nkrumah, Hountondji, Odera Oruka, Wiredu or Gyekye are only
mentioned incidentally and not always judged carefully enough. For instance,
Wiredu’s project of ‘conceptual decolonisation’ is taken as ‘a typical example’
of a ‘reactionary mindset’. (265) Actually Wiredu endeavours with this project
to include original African thought into the worldwide philosophical work of
today. To decolonise the mind does not mean to go back to traditional ways of
thought, but to make them active and influential in present debates.
Odera Oruka does not refrain from giving the names of
12 Kenyan traditional philosophers from different peoples: Mwitani Masero
(Utonga), Njuhi Muthoni (Kikuyu), Simiyu Chaungo (Luhyia), Oruka Rang’inya
(Luo), and others. (Sage Philosophy, Leiden a.o.: Brill 1990) And he
presents more in detail the politician and philosopher Oginga Odinga. His
Philosophy and Beliefs (Nairobi: Initiatives 1992) He calls them ‘sages’,
like Hampaté Bâ had done in his book, written in French, with regard to his own
teacher Tierno Bokar. (La vie et l’enseignement de Tierno Bokar. Le sage
de Bandiagara, Paris: Seuil 1980) As a follow up to that, Yacouba
Konaté is looking for great names of sages further back in history and at the
same time is he investigating the connection between the work of the sages and
the origin of proverbs with philosophical contents. (‘Le syndrome Hampaté
Bâ ou comment naissent les proverbes’, in: Quest. An
International African Journal of Philosophy 8,2; 1994, p. 23-44) Thus it becomes clear how the
philosophical impact of language can originate and why proverbs can be regarded
as philosophical texts in the primarily oral African traditions. (H. Kimmerle,
‘The philosophical text in the African oral tradition’, in: Kimmerle/Wimmer
(eds), Philosophy and democracy in intercultural perspective,
Amsterdam/Atlanta, GA: Rodopi 1997, p. 43-56)
In his book An
essay on African philosophical thought. The Akan conceptual scheme
(Cambridge: University Press 1987) Gyekye refers to the names and the dates of
interviews with Akan ‘wise persons’ (anyansafo) whom
he regards as traditional philosophers. We learn from Asouzu and also from
other African philosophers (Tschiamalenga Ntumba and Mabe) that sagacity cannot
only be found with a certain group of persons. But is there in general such a
recognisable group of ‘wise persons’ in African traditional communities? Are
there persons among the Igbo people who could be identified as sages? Except
his mention of Oruka’s research, Asouzu refers to Ogotemmeli, a blind hunter
and wise person of the Dogon, by quoting the (not quite correct) story, which
Masolo tells about him. (African Philosophy in Search of Identity, Bloomington/
Indianopolis: Indiana University Press 1994) And he knows about the work of
Hallen and Sodipo who have discussed epistemological questions with traditional
healers among the Yoruba. (Hallen/Sodipo, Knowledge,
belief and witchcraft. Analytic experiments in African philosophy,
London: Ethnographica 1986) (134-36) Odera Oruka contests that Ogotemmeli and
the persons who have been interviewed by Hallen and Sodipo may be called
‘sages’ in the sense of the word as he understands it. Is such a rather strict
understanding possible? And what about philosophical sagacity which is
possessed by other people than the sages? These questions arise when Asouzu
refers to ‘the anonymous Igbo philosopher’.
Complementary reflection of living in society makes it
necessary to look at ‘African communalism’ and ‘sense of community’ as they are
worked out by Senghor, Nkrumah, Nyerere and others. (87) However, the
theoretical project of these authors, especially in connection with the
movement of Negritude, is not discussed clearly enough by Asouzu. The
historical context of reassuring African culture of its own value is not part
of his judgment. And these authors are brought together with quite a different
current in the emerging self-consciousness of African philosophy. I mean the
representatives of ethnophilosophy, Tempels, Kagame, Mbiti and others, whose
work was fiercely contested by Hountondji and Towa. It is true that
communalism, by which a somehow idealistic picture of the African sense of
community is drawn, has a limited meaning compared to complementary reflection
of societal relations. It could help to show this by a more detailed
argumentation. Actually the broader ontological context of complementarity in
society, embedding it into a cosmic dimension, is closer to ubuntu than to
communalism. Here again a discussion of conformities and differences would give
sharper contours to the meaning of complementary reflection. According to
Ramose ubuntu refers to the relations between human beings, completing and
supporting each other, and at the same time to the forces of the universe,
which are unfolded and come to self-consciousness in human thinking and
speaking (African Philosophy Through Ubuntu, Harare: Mond Books 1999).
That traditional African philosophy has been practised
mainly in oral forms of tradition and communication does not mean being in any
way less important, less elaborate or less thoughtful than philosophies, which
prefer written forms of tradition and exchange of ideas. I agree also with
Asouzu that there is no strict contradiction between orality and literacy in
the practice of philosophy. (146-148) In this respect the new concept of
writing which is developed by Derrida, putting it exactly on the same level as
the oral use of language, can be very helpful (De la grammatologie,
Paris: Minuit 1967). Nevertheless it is worth-wile to work out the special
possibilities and strong aspects of primarily oral forms of philosophising.
Oluwole has pioneered in this field relying also on the philosophical impact of
oral literature, especially of the Ifa-corpus in the Yoruba tradition. (Philosophy
and Oral Tradition, Lagos: ARK Publications 1999) And a lot can be expected
for the contribution of African philosophy to solving the problems of
philosophy all over the world by bringing together and harmonising both forms
of philosophising, and by combining the strong aspects of them, as Mabe has
suggested (Schriftliche und mündliche Formen philosophischen Denkens in Afrika, Diss. habil.,
TU Berlin 2003).
In her book: Witchcraft, Reincarnation and the
God-Head (Lagos: Excel Publishers 1992) Oluwole argues more cautiously than
Asouzu and with reference to the restrictions of reliable knowledge in Western
philosophy, especially in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, when she
speaks of the belief in supernatural powers, the existence of God and the
coming back of persons from the invisible world of spirits to the visible world
of people living now. Her argumentation runs, roughly speaking, like this: If
finite human beings cannot have reliable, scientifically proved knowledge,
whether these dimensions of thought have a correspondence in reality, the
option that there is such a correspondence (as preferred in the African
worldview) is in the same way possible as the other one that there is not such
a correspondence (as preferred in the Western way of thought). According to
Oluwole the developments in the most advanced forms of science, particularly in
microphysics, strengthen the African position. Like Achebe, to whom Asouzu
refers several times, Oluwole strongly affirms that in African thought ‘nothing
is absolute’. (126) Therefore, she would contest that ‘the worldview of the
traditional African shows … strong moment[s] of the transcendent ontological categories of unity, totality,
universality, comprehensiveness, wholeness and future referentiality as
authentic dimensions of thoroughgoing complemetarism’,
(150) which is a core argument in Asouzu’s book.
The predominant ‘future relatedness’ of Igbo thought,
of which Asouzu speaks repeatedly (150-51, 181 a.m.o.), is also different from
Mbiti’s thesis that the past is the most relevant dimension of time in African
thought. (African religions and philosophy, London 1969) Although
Mbiti’s statement that in African languages no anticipation of future events
farther away than about two years can be expressed, has been contested heavily
by Hountondji, Odera Oruka,Gyekye and others, these
authors do not deny that there is a predominantly backward orientation in the
African way of thought. Therefore, Asouzu’s report about the future relatedness
of the anonymous Igbo philosopher is in sharp contrast to most of the other
philosophies of African peoples we know about. One could say, it adds a
radically new aspect to the African philosophies of time. However, the close
and concrete connection of time and space as ‘integral dimensions of the unity
of consciousness’ and in the same way of ‘the aspects of processes observable
in nature’ and of the ‘aspects of the spiritual immaterial world’ in Asouzu’s
text (175-177) is very much in accordance with the unity of time and space in
the philosophy of Bantu-languages, which is worked out by Kagame. (Sprache
und Sein. Die Ontologie der Bantu Zentralafrikas, Brazzaville/ Heidelberg
1985)
To Asouzu’s ideas about ‘building a viable and
meaningful human family’, can be added Odera Oruka’s conception of a ‘parental
earth ethics’. In this conception the African sense of family is also extended
to humanity as a (concrete) whole. And within the human family different roles
and obligations can be determined. The human rights should be made more
complete by the right to an existence minimum for every human being, which
includes eating, clothing and housing. The former colonising countries, which
are now, not independently from their colonising past, the rich countries of the
world, have clear ethical obligations to share with the former colonised and
now poor countries. In a future related perspective it is wise, if the rich
countries now more effectively share with the poor parts of the world, for in
the long run the relations between dominant and dominated parts of the world
never remain the same, as history teaches us. (‘Ecophilosophy and the Parental
Earth Ethics’, in: Graness/Kresse (eds), Sagacious
Reasoning. Henry Odera Oruka in memoriam,
Frankfurt/M. a.o.: Peter Lang 1997, p. 119-131,
‘Philosophie der Entwicklungshilfe. Die Frage des Rechts auf ein menschliches
Minimum, in: polylog. Zeitschrift für interkulturelles
Philosophieren 6, 2000,
p. 6-16)
In a final
judgment I would say that Asouzu’s book presents a new approach to African
philosophy as a whole and gives valuable details about African philosophy of a
certain region. He argues himself that this kind of regional differentiations
of African philosophy are useful and necessary. (121-22
a.m.o.) This is in line with his general claim for differentiation and
multidimensionality. (450 a.m.o.) Without reducing the
renewing value of Asouzu’s approach to African philosophy in general, we can
add his conception to those of other regional African philosophies. Besides the
knowledge we have about thought systems of African peoples in the literature of
cultural anthropologists, we know about Luba and other Bantu philosophies by
the works of Tempels and Kagame, about Fulani and Toucouleurs philosophies by
Tierno Bokar and Hampaté Bâ, about Dogon philosophy by Ogotemmeli, about Luo,
Lyhsia and other Kenyan philosophies by Odera Oruka, about Akan and Ga
philosophies by Abraham, Wiredu, Gyekye and Kudadjie, about Gikuyu philosophy
by Wanjohi, about Yoruba philosophy by Hallen/Sodipo, Oluwole and Gbadegesin.
And fortunately now we know more about Igbo-philosophy by Asouzu.