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Complementary Reflection, African Philosophy and General Issues in Philosophy |
EXPLANATION, SUPERNATURALISM AND COMPLEMENTARY RATIONALITY.
ESOWE, DIMGBA DIMGBA
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1
I INTRODUCTION .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2-3
II EXPLANATION .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3-6
III SUPERNATURALISM .. .. .. .. .. .. 7-9
IV COMPLEMENTARY
RATIONALITY .. .. .. .. 9-12
V SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSION .. .. .. .. .. 13
BIBLIOGRAPHY .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14-15
ABSTRACT
Man in his
capacity as a knowing being has been observing, experimenting and applying his
knowledge to better his life in this world.
The process of life has shown man that existing realities are ever
unfolding interminably. Yet in his
observational and experimental pursuits, there have been manifestations that
are inexplicable, empirically.
Whereas
some Thinkers disapprove of any phenomenon which cannot be empirically or
rationally explained, others hold that observation and experimentation are only
possible by the benevolence of metaphysical and supernatural powers. Complementary rationality serves to merge
both the empirically explicable and inexplicable facets of knowledge in a
symbiosis of philosophical skepticism and openness. For the proper knowledge that would move society
progressively forward to be achieved, there should be a harmonious fusion of
both empirical, rational and supernatural postulates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Human activity is complex due to the way humans seem to
naturally be. Adler cites Aristotle as
saying that humans are rational animals (742).
This capacity to think varies from person to person. At times, certain influences whether social,
cultural, political, economic, scientific or religious, lead people or groups
of people to think alike or otherwise.
In the process of thinking based on these influences, errors could
manifest. Studies in psychology claim to
reveal the occurrence of systematic deviation on the part of humans from canons
of logic, probability theory, decision theory and statistics (Adler: 742).
In spite of these problems of complexity resulting from
nature, society or both, man is moving forward in quest for a better life. This quest for a better life prompts man to
make enquiries concerning himself and the world in which he lives. The Spanish existentialist philosopher,
Miguel de Unamuno is quoted by Omoregbe as saying that “… Man is preoccupied
about the question of God because he is preoccupied about himself, about his
own existence, the meaning and purpose of his existence, where he came from and
where he is going, especially what will happen to him after death” (26).
These enquiries seem to have opposing dimensions resulting
from the fact that natural scientists and religionists answer the above
questions from opposing angles. While
natural scientists insist that what is empirically explainable is what exists,
religionists believe that man cannot totally explain existence through his own
rationality. Amidst this ambivalent
situation, Professor Asouzu introduces the philosophical concept of
complementary reflection as a panacea “that enables us overcome the limitations
the ambivalence of our existential situations place on the mind as to grossly
impair its capacity to perceive and comprehend reality clearly and
authentically” (Methods and Principles … Beyond African Philosophy:10).
This paper is an attempt to explore the possibility of
moving human activity forward regardless of the various opposing views that
emanate from diverse ideological mindset of people in the world of science and
religion.
II EXPLANATION
Ideas concerning explanation abound in philosophical
history. Philosophers such as Aristotle,
Hume, Kant and Mill came up with important positions (Kitcher: 1915). Detailed models of explanation which took on
a scientific form took root in the twentieth century. In this vein, Kitcher sees “explanations to
be arguments in which a law of nature plays an essential role among the
premises” (195). Thines expatiates by
affirming that “…Explaining a phenomenon means determining its causes;
understanding it amounts to determining its role in the overall behaviour of
the individual” (143). Thines apart from
defining explanation as the ‘why’ of a phenomenon, adds the importance of its
understanding, since this would enable the phenomenon to be accorded a role in
the shaping of people’s attitude to life.
Several things have been happening and are still happening
in the world. There are times when
people ask whether what they hear had actually happened. They thus seek an explanation to prove its reality. Philosophers have for about
twenty-five centuries been battling with the relationship
between Appearance and Reality (Hacker:1). In order to find his bearing in the
activities of life, man has been appealing to his perceptual capacities. These are those capacities through which “we can
discern, discriminate or detect features of the world surrounding us”
(Hacker:1).
In talking about our perceptual capacities, we talk about
man’s rationality. Scientific
explanation depends often on this rational model of explanation. This model is perceived to have two facets
according to Newton-Smith (4). They are:
one, specification of the goal of science; two, specification of principles of
comparism between rival theories to ascertain the achievement extent of the
goal in question. He lists rationalists
who include Popper, Lakatos and Lauden, stating that they really differ in the
offering of specifications both for goals of science and of the principles of
comparism (4).
Cultural influences need to be understood in talking about
explanation. How one explains a
phenomenon in one culture may be different from how it is explained in another
environment. This raises a philosophical
problem. That of the initial translation
of the language of a culture. To
buttress this difficulty and the
necessity for tackling it Simon rhetorically asks “can we use our categories to
understand the social practices of another culture, for instance, our
categories of
science, magic and religion?”(741). Adler notices an ambivalence of two
tendencies in constructing a theory of rationality. Whereas one of them projects formal rules
whose violation in real life could have serious consequences, the other asserts
that “people’s actual practice provides the only standard.” (742), A popular model, incorporating both tendencies.
Adler continues, accepts the fact that the principles or norms which give the
utmost satisfactory agreement between our reasoning intuitions and the
requirements of theory or system are justified.
Contributing to empirical explanation,
Causation consists in three conditions: (a) Spatio-temporal
contiguity – there is no ‘action at a distance;’ (b)
temporal priority of the cause – there is no future or retrocausation,
and, for that matter, no simultaneous causation among distinct events; and (c)
the instantiation of general regularities by particular causal sequences (71).
The fact that explanation is limited to man’s ability to
perceive, limits philosophical activities to the same degree. Baker asserts that “philosophers fancy that
they give explanations of the essential nature of the world, the mind and
language. On Wittengenstein’s view this
is misconceived. Philosophy is purely
descriptive”(22). He sees philosophy as
a tool used to clarify the language grammar and to construct important speech
rules, the violation of which does not matter.
Explanation, he says, would only be possible if it could get beyond
rules to grasp a deeper foundation. But
this is impossible, he argues, as any deeper explanation results only to
another set of rules of grammar and as such is “not answerable to reality in
the currency of truth” (22). He sums up
his position by averring that “…there are no theses or conclusions in
philosophical grammar, i.e. nothing which could be called the terminus of
philosophical proof” (22).
Metaphysical naturalism also known as philosophical
naturalism or ontological naturalism, takes an ontological approach to
naturalism. This concept is of the view
that the supernatural does not exist, thus strengthening atheism. In contrast, methodological naturalism,
according to Steven D. Schaphersman, is “the adoption or assumption of
philosophical naturalism within scientific method with or without fully
accepting or believing it… science is not metaphysical and does not depend on the
ultimate truth of any metaphysics for its success (although science does have
metaphysical implications)… (4).
However, Schaphersman is of the view that methodological naturalism must
be adopted and used in formulating theories for the success of scientific
activity. Though we may not understand
the ultimate truth of naturalism, we still have to adopt it and study nature as
though it is all that there is (4).
III. SUPERNATURALISM
The study
of explanation as a scientific activity has so far shown that philosophers are
not totally unaware of the existence of empirically inexplicable
phenomena. For the Bible to record that
Enoch was taken by God to heaven without seeing death (Gen. 5:24); that Elijah
was carried into heaven by a fiery Chariot without dying (2Kings 2:11); and
that Jesus Christ was seen by His Disciples as He was taken from earth into
heaven by a cloud after he had resurrected from the dead (Acts 1:9); shows that
these events though not scientifically explicable, really happened in the annals
of the history of the world.
Pennock
contends that “as supernatural agents and powers are above and beyond the
natural world and its agents and powers and are not constrained by natural
laws, only logical impossibilities constrain what a supernatural agent could
not do” (5). He further reasons that
should it become possible to grasp supernatural powers through the means of
natural knowledge, such powers by definition would not be supernatural. Pascal corroborates this position by the
following monologue:
…’Either God is or he is not.’ But to which view shall we be inclined? Reason cannot decide this question. Infinite chaos separates us. At the far end of this infinite distance a
coin is being spun which will come down heads or tails. How will you wager? Reason cannot make you choose either, reason
cannot prove either wrong (21).
The issue
of self-identity and origin which makes man to ask who am I? And where do I come from is seen by
Mountcastle as eternally important (45).
These questions make man to have what Sartre as cited by Omoregbe calls
feeling of emptiness and uneasiness within him (27). These feelings themselves make man to crave
for self-perpetuation which in turn prompts us to think and ask questions about
God (27). Mountcastel links Augustine
and Acquinas with saying that certain premises are unproveable as well as
unimaginable without faith, yet they have to be for any intellectual engagement
to be fruitful. These have the logical, laws, the triune nature of God, and
creatio ex nihilo, as examples (54). On
his part Winston emphatically states “… all effective moral action is wholly
dependent on God” (49). He goes on to assert that Philo was not tired of
insisting that except for God’s grace no human being can accomplish anything,
therefore people who claim any achievement to themselves are “godless Villains”
(49).
In
presenting the argument for the existence of God from the point of view of
Design or Teleology, Hick (23, 24) presents the expositions of Paley who in his
book Natural Theology: or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the
Deity collected from the Appearances of Nature (1802), used the analogy of a
rock in the desert as compared to a watch lying on the ground to prove the
appropriateness of an intelligent Designer.
This is because while a rock could be dropped by wind or flood in the
desert, a watch must have been designed to be able to exist in its complex
form. So also is the complexity of man
ad the entire universe to be attributed to an intelligent Designer.
From an
African perspective, Professor Iwe after examining the traditional African in
his world view associates him with belief in the supernatural. He says concerning the African: “For him, the
natural and supernatural, though logically distinguishable are inseparable
dynamically and in reality.” He further
states that “in the traditional African philosophy and vision of life, a purely
and exclusively naturalistic explanation or understanding of human life and its
experiences is alien, insufficient, and therefore deficient, without the
spiritual and supernatural dimensions”(4).
The
presentations so far in this section show that in spite of what scientific
progress man has made, there are things, much more in existence which are
visible and being experienced that defy scientific explanation. These mostly could be accepted - as there is
nothing else man can do about them - to be proof of the existence of the
Supernatural. Even if one does not
accept it by faith, one could accept it
by simply acknowledging He exists.
IV. COMPLEMENTARY
RATIONALITY
In every matter of human existence, truth is
necessary. This is because truth
preserves dignity. Philosophy as an
activity owes humanity the responsibility of asking the right questions whose
answers would bridge the gap of misunderstanding between conflicting
ideologies. There are some extreme
positions which if unamended could lead continually to unnecessary waste of
energy in one group trying to prove its idea better and vice versa.
Two of such extreme claims are hereunder presented to
buttress the need for a closing of the gap.
The first of them states:
Our culture is above all a scientific culture. We look to science both to formulate our
problems and to provide solutions to them.
Our paradigms of explanation are scientific, and our conception of
understanding is modelled upon scientific understanding (Hacker:177)
The second of them reads:
With a view to action experience seems in no respect
inferior to art, and men of experience succeed even better than those who have
theory without experience… But yet, we think that knowledge and understanding
belong to art rather than to experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser
than men of experience…; and this because the former know the cause, but the
latter do not. For men of experience
know that the thing is so, but not know why, while the others know the ‘why’
and the cause (Aristotle:499).
Professor
Asouzu recognizes the danger of fragmentally pursuing knowledge and assuming
such knowledge as complete, perfect and satisfactory. In his work, Ibuanyidanda he states “As a
scientific paradigm, all forms of world immanent pre-deterministic concomitant
ways of seeing the world have the capacity to focus the mind only on known
causes, persons and events. When this
happens, this way of seeing the world easily hinders the mind from attaining
ultimate expression beyond what the immediacy can provide” (19). He further says that the methods of
explanations based on this reasoning are grossly incomplete as they are not
comprehensive.
Asouzu
points out that the empiricist technique is a method likely to breed confusion
and discrimination. This is as a result
of the tendency of human beings being judged by the prompting of the senses of
their judges. He sees the same weakness
in the position of those who based their judgements on the directives of their
intuition or reason. He therefore sees
both the empiricists and rationalists introducing complicating situations of
division which could hinder people from appreciating the comprehensive nature
of reality to enable the building of a harmonious complementary relationship
with each other (Ibuanyidanda:167).
Though man
is believed to have freedom of speech and freedom of association, the right to live,
to be educated, to worship and so on, knowledge is important to make the
appropriate choices. To elucidate this
point, Olsen posits, “…freedom does not operate in a moral, intellectual,
spiritual, and relational vacuum; for God, our fellowmen, nature, and the
physical world are basic realities in our existence” (35). Since these realities exist, it would be nice
to fashion a model of operation and understanding for mutual relationship.
Arising
from this understanding of the existence of the afore-mentioned realities,
Asouzu makes a case for complementarity.
He states that “since reality keeps unfolding its internal character and
continues to make itself felt interminably, both at the physical and
metaphysical domains, it would be futile to indulge in apodictic proofs or
denials of certain types of phenomena, most especially when they are encryped”
(Ibuaru: 140). He insists that “Beyond
what is seen, lies something to be comprehended” (Ibuaru: 141). While acknowledging that most “spiritual
supernatural phenomena” deal mostly with paradigms that are alternatives for
better ways of action, and after mentioning “such phenomena as spirits, charms,
mermaid, jujus, divination, consultation of oracles, miracle healing, sorcery,
magic, witchcraft etc., as examples found in Nigeria, he cautions that if the
“modus operandi” of any of these instance is “selective, inconsistent, and
contradictory, there are reasons also to doubt the foundation on which it
stands” (142).
Asouzu emphasizes
the point that all modes of encrypted phenomena can cause division in the
thought process due to the claims attached to their modes of existence. When such a situation arises, the mind
because of this descends into encrypted rationality. This raises the challenge
of restoration of the human mind to a balanced consciousness, hence
complementary ontology aims at the re-empowerment of the mind (Ibuaru: 142). He
sees the task of philosophy to include “an unmistakable instructive,
illuminative and pedagogical task” which would be “unwise to deny the existence
of supernatural phenomena bearing in mind the capacity of the human mind to
mutate and transform as the conflux of all missing links” (143). Because the human mind which has the capacity
to be most benevolent and compassionate, could also degenerate to the abyss of
wickedness and absurdity, our approach to the mysterious unknown should be done
in the mindset of “philosophical skepticism and openness all at the same time.” This will enable the mind to penetrate “all
missing links in the comprehensiveness of their interrelatedness” and still
“hold gullibility in check” (143).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The world
we live in exhibits great complexity.
Man in his quest to understand himself and his environment has
undertaken to study, learn, and apply his knowledge in his daily
endeavours. Through observation and
experimentation, certain natural laws have been postulated as theories. These have been applied toward enhancing the
affairs of life. It is also evident that
certain realities exist which man does not completely understand. Thus, though being rational, man has his
limitations. What could be responsible
for these other phenomena that influence human behaviour? Metaphysical and supernatural manifestations,
and realities.
It was
seen in the course of this work that while some philosophers deny anything
supernatural and hold strictly on empirical and rational experience in the bid
to explaining causes and effects, others strongly subscribe to supernaturalism
as the only source of knowledge.
Complementary
rationality arose to bridge the relationship of these Thinkers. This is in view of the realization that all
realities exist in a comprehensive interrelatedness. Therefore, every course of action serves to
complement each other in filling the missing links of the interrelatedness of
all existing realities.
This paper
concludes by submitting that the proper knowledge and understanding needed for
a progressive growth of life in this world is that which harmoniously imbibes
the complementary qualities of both empirical, rational and supernatural
postulates.
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