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THE ERKLAEREN-VERSTEHEN CONTROVERSY
AND ITS
RELEVANCE FOR AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY
BY
IWUAGWU,
EMMANUEL KELECHI
TABLE
OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………….1
THE ERKLAEREN-VERSTEHEN CONTROVERSY
AND ITS
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND…………………………………………..1
EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING
IN THE PHYSICAL
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES………………………………………………..3
EXPLANATION WITH REASON………………………………………..4
TELEOLOGICAL OR PURPOSIVE EXPLANATIONS…………………4
EXPLANATION AS A REDUCTIVE ACTIVITY………………………..5
EXPLANATION BY SUBSUMTION UNDER
LAW…………………….6
PROBABILISTIC EXPLANATION……………………………………….8
EXPLANATION AND PREDICTION IN
SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY………9
UNDERSTANDING AND EXPLANATION
IN SOCIAL SCIENCES…..10
THE RELEVANCE OF ERKLAEREN-VESTEHEN
CONTROVERSY
FOR AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY……………………………………………11
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………...14
WORKS CITED…………………………………………………………….15
THE ERKLAEREN –VERSTEHEN CONTROVERSY AND ITS RELEVANCE
FOR AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY.
Philosophy begins in wonder. Many facts in life are not immediately intelligible.
Many natural events and modes of human behaviour puzzle us, thus seeking some
sort of explanation. The primary interest of philosophy is therefore to provide
answers or explanations to the fundamental questions of life. In seeking explanation
we are also seeking to understand the phenomena under investigation. Explanation
makes what may not be immediately intelligible understandable; it unravels the
apparent mystery surrounding it and makes it somehow familiar and intelligible.
In explaining we engage ourselves in answering questions as to “how”, ‘when’ ‘why’ etc. in explaining also we try
to simplify or clarify a given proposition or position to make it more comprehensible.
In the
history of philosophy there are various schools of thought, which have championed
various positions with regard to the most suitable method of explanation and
understanding in the natural and social sciences. This controversy most pronounced
in the philosophical disputations of the positivists, the neo-positivists and
the behavioral scientists will be briefly reviewed in this paper.
In as much the problem of
explanation and understanding is a universal problem in philosophy, the Erklaeren-verstehen
(explanation- understanding) controversy will be studied with regard to its
relevance to African philosophy.
THE ERKLAEREN-VERSTEHEN CONTROVERSY AND ITS HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND
The
Erklaeren-verstehen controversy simply translated means the explanation- understanding
controversy. Ordinarily in every aspect of human study what an explanation does
is to provide understanding. According to
Something happens which puzzles
us, and in seeking an explanation
we are seeking to understand it. This can only be, it is suggested, by
assimilating
what we cannot understand to what we can –by showing that things that
puzzle
us are capable of being interpreted, in some not immediately obvious
way,
as ‘the same’ as the things that do not puzzle us (77).
From the above it is clear that
what we do not understand needs an explanation. The Erklaeren- verstehen controversy
is more of an interdisciplinary controversy, which arose in sorting out the
primary methodological concerns proper to the philosophy of the natural, and
socio- historical sciences. Simply put, can we use the same methodology of explanation
and understanding in the physical and social sciences? Are there different ways
of understanding and explaining social and physical phenomena?
The Erklaeren- Verstehen
controversy in the philosophy of the natural and human sciences as articulated
by Karl-Otto Apel has three developmental stages (Contemporary Philosophy,
19-49). The terminological distinction between ‘Erklaeren’ and Verstehen’ was
first made in order to suggest an epistemological foundation for the methodological
autonomy-claim of the historical sciences’ or more generally of the social sciences
by J.G.Droysen in 1858 and W. Dilthey in 1883. This distinction was considered
to be based on Hermeneutics as against the natural sciences which were considered
to be based on causal or nomological explanations. This can be considered to
be the foundation and first stage of this controversy also called the E/V controversy.
Max Weber adopted it with some modifications for his foundation of understanding
sociology. At this stage the primary methodological concern was to answer the
question “whether or not these new sciences… had to follow the paradigm of the
natural sciences “ (e.g. physics) which appears more successful after getting
rid of sympathetic and teleological understanding in favour of causal or nomological
explanation.
The second
stage of this controversy was the Neopostivists in defense of their “unified
science” thesis explicitly rejected the explanation-understanding dichotomy
and the autonomy claim of the social sciences, the Neopositivists thesis was
in turn based on the deductive- nomological (DN) model of causal explanation
as it was newly articulated by Carl G Hempel and P.Oppengeim. This position
of Hempel will be briefly outlined later.
This controversy,
which appears temporarily rested, was again genuinely revived from within analytic
philosophy, which was an offshoot of logical positivism. Karl Popper, the later
Wittgenstein and British ‘ordinary language philosophy’ championed this. This
revival “was inaugurated through the development of Popperism especially as
a response to the challenge of the history of science) and by the emergence
of a certain Neo-Wittgensteinianism with inspirations from Collinwood, Webber
and Merleau-Ponty” (Apel, 23-24).
This third stage is
currently being championed by G.H. Von Wright and the “critical theory” school
as well as the “transcendental pragmatics”. The pertinent viewpoints of these
scholars and schools have contributed immensely in the proper understanding
of the various sciences with their attendant methods of explanation and understanding.
EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING IN THE
PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
Explanation and understanding are
very indispensable tools for the growth of any scientific study be it physical
or social science. Without understanding every phenomena or action is nothing
but a puzzle and without explanation it remains an unresolved puzzle which hinders
progress and development. Explanation presupposes the questions “why”, “when”’
“how far”, “how much” etc.
According to John Hospers
in his Introduction to Philosophical Analysis:
“Why” normally introduces a request for an explanation. But “why?” is
an
ambiguous question: it may be the request for reason or the request for
an
explanation (240).
According to Hospers when one is
asked why he believed a proposition is true, he is been asked to proffer reasons
in support of his belief. This reason makes the proposition more plausible and
acceptable. Explanations may also be of events, processes or happenings in the
course of nature: we may be asked to explain why iron rust, why rivers flood,
why one sleeps, why cancer kills etc. Explanation of why events occur which
is what is mostly involved in scientific explanation is only one of the several
kinds of explanation. Ordinarily we can explain in the sense of making something
clearer, we may explain what a passage of a poem means.
Because of the importance
of explanation and understanding as scientific tools of study, philosophers
of various schools of thought and disciplines have put forward various methods
of explanation and understanding as well as various senses in which these concepts
can be employed. We will now briefly look at these positions.
1.
EXPLANATION WITH REASON:
In
this context one is challenged to provide the underlying reasons why he holds
to certain beliefs as true and others as false. Faced with typical social phenomena
in need of explanation for example why people go to mosques on Fridays and to
churches on Sunday? Why do people believe in and worship God? This typical social
issue is open to various explanations. The Marxist with the bias that religion
is the opium of the masses may explain this phenomenon away by saying that the
poor take refuge in God as some kind of “father-substitute”, benefactor and
protector in a cold and harsh world. On the other hand, the psychoanalyst with
Freudian bent will employ the childhood sense of dependence in trying to explain
this phenomenon, whereby he sees the childhood desire for parental care and
protection as the underlying reason for man’s believe in an Omnipotent all provident
father. Outside the Marxian and Freudian explanations there may be other primitive
reasons underlying such belief. This model of explanation with reasons is a
very much acceptable model of explanation in the social sciences like sociology,
anthropology etc than in the physical sciences.
(2) TELEOLOGICAL OR PURPOSIVE EXPLANATIONS.
According to John Hospers this
is the oldest type of explanation.
Storms and other natural catastrophes
were thought to be explained by
the wrath of Gods or other beings who controlled these events, and gods
were believed to do these things in order to wreak vengeance on human
beings, or bring them back into line or Display their power, and so on (245).
Hospers, however, did acknowledge
that this primitive way of explaining, purposive explanation is no longer in
vogue though we explain events in human realm by brining in purpose. For example
we can explain the action of a man who drank five bottles of beer in twenty
minutes by saying “someone bet him N5,000 that he couldn’t do it.”
In teleological or purposive explanation
we state the purpose or intended goal underlying actions and events in nature.
A fundamental point of departure between explanations by reference to reasons
and purposive explanation is that in the later (purposive) the goals or reasons
for actions are consciously entertained whereas in the former they need not
be consciously entertained. This is why some scholars also call this explanation
intentional explanation.
According to Karl Otto Apel, G.H. Von Wright offered the most explicit
and most comprehensive methodological application of the Neo-Wittgensteinian
approach with regard to the causality/teleology- focus of the E/V controversy (30). Von Wright proposed as a humanistic
alternative to causal explanation in the natural sciences a model of teleological
or intentional explanation based on five arguments of post- Wittgesteinian action
theory (G.H.Von Wright, 10).
These five arguments in support
of teleological explanation include (a) internationality, (b) practical inference,
(c) the onto-semantical distinction between the language games or conceptual
frameworks related to reasons of actions on the one hand and causes of behaviour
–events on the other (d) the logical connections argument and finally (e) intentional
explanation (Apel, 30-31). This kind of explanation is classified under functional
explanation and is a veritable tool in social sciences and in history.
2.
EXPLANATION AS A REDUCTIVE ACTIVITY
Here explanation is seen as a reduction
of a strange unusual, puzzling or complex phenomenon, process or event to term
which describe a commonplace or familiar occurrence. According to P.W. Bridgman:
Explanation consists in reducing
a situation to elements with which
we are so familiar that we accept them as a matter of course so that
our curiosity rests.
This view is also shared by Vernon
Pratt who holds that it is familiarity, which makes an action immediately intelligible.
A familiar action needs no explanation (79). The action of a man who wears an
overcoat in harmattan is one with which we are familiar, whereas the behaviour
of a person who lies down in the middle of the road is strange, and therefore
needs explaining.
According
to Norman Campbell:
By tracing a relation between the unfamiliar
changes and the
extremely familiar Changes we are rendering the farmer intelligible,
we are explaining them.
Thus by reducing the unfamiliar
to the familiar we are explaining it, making it understandable. We are familiar
with the fact that kerosene does not mix with water and that coloured water
mixes freely with uncoloured water. When we see a red liquid failing to mix
with a transparent liquid water. It appears somehow strange until we are told
that the coloured liquid is kerosene, immediately the apparently strange occurrence
becomes intelligible and understandable.
(4) EXPLANATION BY SUBSUMPTION UNDER LAW
This model hold that explanation
is nothing but subsuming whatever is strange and needs explanation under a general
law or theory which immediately unravels the mystery surrounding it.
According to John Hospers:
Whether we explain
particular occurrences or things, reference to
laws or theories is always involved in their explanation: and the law
or
theory must be one we already accept, else we will not accept the
explanation (242).
Thus for Hospers, to explain an
event is simply to bring it under
a law: and to explain a law is to bring it under another law. To explain
an event we need the laws and the particular facts. Example “when we ask for
the explanation of a particular event such a “why did the pipe burst?’ the explanation
include (1) certain laws of nature e.g. that water expands when it freezes)
and (2) certain particular facts (such as that the temperature dropped below
the freezing point in the basement last night) with both of these, the law and
particular fact we can explain the event (241). Even when we explain the laws
of nature we invoke other laws of nature. Example why do balloons rise in air?
Why does iron rust? Etc.
This
model of explanation is currently been championed by Carl G.Hempel as Deductive
–nomological explanation and probabilistic explanation. In his essay Explanation
in Science and in History which is concerned with the logic of modes of
explanation in inquiry, Hempel compares explanation in natural science and in
history. He holds that two basic kinds of laws are developed in science. First
those based primarily on deduction in which the thing to be explained is subsumed
under a general law, often with a causal connection. The second is the “probabilistic-
statistical’ laws which refer to what often happens rather than what always
happens. Hempel regards these as the two basic modes of nomological explanation
(explanation through law) in scientific enquiry (Brown, 154).
Hempel is of the view that
explanations in historical inquiry fall under one or the other of these two
basic modes of scientific nomological explanation.
Hempel also calls the deductive-nomological
explanation covering law model or deductive model of explanation and holds that
a good number of scientific explanations can be regarded as deductive – nomological
in character. He posits this example:
Consider, for example, the explanation
of mirror images of rainbows, or
of the appearance that a spoon handle is bent at the point where it emerges
from a glass of water, in all these cases, the explanandum is
deductively
subsumed under the laws of reflection and refraction. Similarly,
certain
aspects of free fall and of planetary motion can be accounted for by
deductive
subsumption under Galileo’s or Kepler’s laws (Hempel, 157).
Hempel further argues that causal
explanations which in explaining particular event specify its cause are also
deductive nomological in character though not all deductive nomological explanations
are causal (158).
PROBABILISTIC EXPLANATION
According to Hempel while in the
deductive-nomological explanation the laws and the theoretical principles involved
are of strictly universal form. They hold that in all cases, with certain specified
conditions fulfilled, an occurrence of certain nature will result. The probabilistic
explanation has no such force or universal character. According to Hempel:
This kind of explanation, too is nomological, i.e. it accounts for a
given phenomenon by reference to general laws or theoretical
principles ;but some or all of these are of probabilistic-statistical
form , i.e. they are generally speaking, assertions to the effect
that if certain specified conditions are realized then the occurrence
of such and such kind will come about with such and such a
statistical probability (159).
An example of a probabilistic explanation
is that the subsiding of acute stomach pains in a given case might well be attributed
to and explained by reference to the administration of 50mg of flagyl tablet.
This particular event cannot warrant us to invoke a universal law to the effect
that the administration of 50mg of flagyl will invariably subside acute stomach
pains. We can only assert it with some high statistical probability not with
certainty.
John
Hospers refers to this probabilistic explanation as explanations which involves
laws only in a very loose sense – a rough-and –ready generalization that is
true much of the time but does not hold true for all cases”(242). For example,
the fact that Tom caught cold because he has been playing with Dick who had
cold cannot be defended when we are reminded that Harry also played with Dick
and did not catch cold.
Hempel
therefore concluded that probabilistic explanation is nomological in that it
presupposes general laws;
But because these laws are of statistical rather than of strictly
universal form, the resulting explanatory arguments are inductive
rather than deductive in character. An inductive argument of this
kind explains a given phenomenon by showing that, in view of
certain particular events and certain statistical laws, its occurrence
was to be expected with high logical, or inductive, probability (160).
EXPLANATION AND PREDICTION IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY
It is the view of Hospers
and other analytic philosophers that to explain something is to predict it.
“The explanation of an event or of a law must explain why this event occurred
rather that than some other one”(Hospers, 242).
An
explanation must go beyond the particular event explained .It must explain other
events or laws including some future events. Hospers argues that the test of
an explanatory principle is its predictive power, which enables one to make
accurate predictions on the basis of it. He says:
Since laws explain many other things beside the events they were
invoked to explain, and since many of these other occurrences
will quite naturally be in future, the laws would consequently
explain these also (243).
Thus our knowledge that water expands
on freezing will enable us to predict that the bottle of water in the deep freezer
will burst if left overnight there. It must however be known that explanatory
power of laws is not enough, it must be combined with a statement about particular
conditions for it to yield a prediction. Even in social sciences Karl-Otto Apel
speaks of predictively-relevant explanations of recurrent actions (i.e. ways
of behaviour), by recurrent motives (i.e. causally-effective good or bad reasons,
including wants, beliefs and habitualized rules ), (Apel, 43).
This emphasis on the predictive aspect of the social sciences is being
championed by the positivists. One of its advocates, the contemporary economist
Milton Friedman writes:
The ultimate goal of a positive science is the development of a
“theory” or “hypothesis” that yields valid and meaningful (i.e.
not
truistic ) predictions about phenomena not yet observed
(Methodology, 511).
Among the many interesting implications
of this conception of science Vernon Pratt hold that this view has led some
thinkers to argue against one’s intuitions, thinking that there is no need for
a theory to be based upon assumptions which are true to reality (74).
UNDERSTANDING AND EXPLANATION IN SOCIAL
SCIENCES.
As we have seen above Carl
G. Hempel consistently argued that his two basic modes of explanation does not
go only for the natural sciences but also for the social sciences and history.
Hence he is of the opinion that there is no need to look for different modes
of explanation and understanding for different sciences. He said the above position
simply means,
That the nature of understanding, in the sense in which explanation
is meant to give us an understanding of empirical phenomena, is
basically the same in all areas of scientific inquiry; and that the
deductive and the probabilistic model of nomological explanation
accommodate vastly more than just the explanatory arguments of
say, classical mechanics: in particular, they accord well also with
the character of explanations that deal with the influence of rational
deliberations…(Explanations, 178).
Against this background of the
parallel between social and natural sciences especially as put forward by Mill
with regard to the possibility of predicting and generalizing human behaviour,
Peter Winch, Alasdair Macintyre and John Beattie argued that since social science
inquiries are about conscious or thinking people, its inquiry must be conducted
on a different basis from natural science.
Peter
Winch argues forcefully in his book The Idea of a Social Science, that
since human action intrinsically involves meaning and deliberation, the analyst
must understand this “from the inside” as it were, if he is to
understand it as human action: it is not just a matter of observing it
from outside as in the natural sciences (Brown, 190). According to Winch:
The historian or sociologist of religion must himself have some
religious feeling if he is to make sense of the religious movement
he is studying and understand the considerations which govern the
the lives of its participants. A historian of art must have some aesthetic
sense if he is to understand the problem confronting the artist of his
periods… any more reflective understanding must necessarily
presuppose … the participants’ unreflective understanding (194).
In this Winch is arguing that since
one of the things that mark human beings as humans is their possession of ideas
and values, it is only through an understanding of these and the associated
norms and rules which govern meaningful action in different societies , that
the scholar can reach a proper understanding and explanation of social action.
While
Macintyre agrees with Winch he calls for more than understanding of local views
and ideas in order to make a proper analysis of social situations.
On
his own Beattie agrees with Winch and Macintyre that ideas and values form an
essential part of social action and social institutions and must be understood
as such, he however observes that in every inquiry especially social inquiry,
‘pure description’ is never feasible. We never come with totally open minds
to the data, we are already biased.
It should
be noted that the above scholars share the tendency to speak of ‘understanding’,
‘explanation’, or ‘meanings’ rather
than ‘general laws’, ‘measurement’ or ‘verification’, this stance is quite different
from that of the positivists.
More recently
the opinions of Winch and his school are being reinforced by Vernon Pratt who
equates familiarity with intelligibility and understanding. He is of the view
that when an action is our own we know that it is associated with a particular
kind of ‘conscious experience’ and understand it immediately. When, for example,
I throw the watch I am trying to repair across the room, I know myself that
it is a manifestation of an irrepressible feeling of frustration welling up
in me. This my conscious experience enables me to understand and explain the
action of one who behaves as such. According to Pratt:
It is this familiarity from-the-inside … that constitutes ‘intelligibility’
as far as actions are concerned what I understand immediately, what
it makes no sense to seek to explain, are actions of the kind I myself
have performed, for in their case I know the ‘inner-experience’ with
which they are associated. Understanding other peoples’behaviour is
thus a matter of interpreting it as somehow involving those same
association (80).
From the foregoing it should be
clear that though all sciences follow some aspects of scientific investigation
the social sciences and the physical or natural sciences must have different
method or standards of valuation. We can’t dismiss the social sciences from
the scientific community because they fail the physical sciences criteria of
prediction and verification. Every science must be judged by its standards and
the standards and methodology of all sciences cannot be the same in all cases.
THE RELEVANCE OF ERKLAEREN-VESTEHEN CONTROVERSY FOR
AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY.
Without prejudice to the universalist
school of thought in African philosophy as represented by Bodunrin, Kwasi Wiredu,
Odera Oruka and Pauline Hountondji who hold that a philosophical problem has
a universal relevance and the same methods to all men everywhere irrespective
of cultural affliction. African philosophy has a distinguishing mark of being
idea, meaning and value laden; this feature is not immediately discernable which
has led some scholars to dismiss it as no philosophy.
All philosophy, as
we have observed above, begins with wonder. It grows out of the need to provide
answers to the basic question posed by man and his environment like the reality
of death, the seen effects of invisible force, birth, growth, sickness, change
of weather, the idea of time etc. Since African philosophy like every other
philosophy is a search to unravel or demystify some puzzles in nature and to
provide answers to some fundamental questions about man and his environment,
the importance of the Erkslaren –Vestehen controversy for it cannot be over
emphasized.
Bodunrin in
his article “The question of African philosophy” analysed the trends put forward
by Odera Oruka as the current repository of African philosophy (philosophy,
vol.52). Scholars like J.Mbiti, Oruka, Bodunrin, K.C Anyanwu, Onyenwuenyi, Wiredu
etc. have also suggested some form of methodology for African philosophy which
can basically be classified under the following four methods: the free style
methodology of conceptual analysis and integrative methodology. In whichever
perspective or methodology we are presenting African philosophy its primary
role will be to do nothing other than explaining the questions raised in life
and to lead man to have a better understanding of himself, his fellow man and
the world in which he lives naturally, socially, metaphysically etc.
The relevance
of the Erklaeren-Verstehen controversy and its attendant contributions to the
growth of philosophical body of Knowledge becomes very pronounced when we consider
the fact that African philosophy viewed either from its ethno-philosophic perspective
or from the perspective of philosophic sagacity where it emerges as African
wisdom, is to a great extend reposed in proverbs, myths, folklores and signs.
This fact makes the question of explanation and understanding indispensable
in African philosophy. Thus African wisdom concealed in proverbs need to be
exposed or unveiled to make them intelligible meaningful and understandable.
The idea of
cause and effect plays a prominent role in African philosophy the apparent existence
of invisible forces that cause some visible effects cannot be dismissed by the
wave of hand. There is need to explain and understand their reality or non-existence.
The controversy can assist in no small measure in proffering a model of explanation.
Teleological,
causal, intentional or purposive explanation model can as well be said to be
indigenous or widespread to the African. For the African, nothing happens for
nothing, there must be a purpose for whatever happens in nature (the Igbo proverb,
says: “the toad does not run in the day time for nothing”). Explanations of
strange and humanly unexplainable occurrences are shifted to the spirit world,
the gods must have a reason. Oracles are consulted in search of explanations
from the gods. African philosophy shares the anti-positivists position that
the social and physical sciences should have their peculiar methods. Quite aware
that diversity in culture, religion and social milieu significantly colour the
philosophy of a people, it opts for the understanding of a people’s philosophy
taking cognizance of their socio-cultural milieu, their lived experience and
their peculiar problems and challenges. These are significant ingredients to
an understanding and explaining of a people’s philosophy. It will be wrong to
use the same standard of valuation to judge people of all cultures .a phenomenon
or behaviour immediately intelligible and understandable in Owerri, Nigeria
may be very strange and in dire need of explanation in Sokoto, Nigeria.
The relevance of the Erklaeren-Verstehen
controversy for African philosophy is also corroborated by the fact that most
of the models of Explanation outlined above are locatable in the framework of
African philosophy. In talking of explanation with Reason, though some reasons
held may be religious or questionable, the fact remains that reasons are presented
in explaining events, processes or actions.
CONCLUSION:
Though the Erklaeren-Verstehen controversy has universal relevance to
philosophical enterprise. It is not without its special relevance for African
philosophy. As a written philosophy African philosophy (with apology to the
African origin of Greek philosophy) is relatively young and need to conceptualize
and articulate its thought in universally comprehensible and acceptable manner.
It cannot achieve this without proper understanding and explanation of its standpoint,
its novelty and its pragmatic relevance. On this note the relevance of this
controversy to its development and progress cannot be over-emphasized. Explanation
and understanding will surely save it from its tag of mythology and irrationality.
The revival of this controversy by African philosopher will not be out of place
for it will bring out the critical theoretical aspect of African philosophy.
WORKS
CITED
Apel, Karl Otto.
“The Erklaeren-Verstehen controversy in the philosophy of the
Natural and human sciences” in Contemporary Philosophy: A new survey.
Vol.II, Ed. Guttorm Floistad . London:
Martinus Nijhoff , 1982.
Bodunrin, P. O.
“The Question of African Philosophy” in Philosophy in Africa:
Trends and Perspectives.
Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1985.
Brown, Stuart, John Fauvel et al.
Conceptions of Inquiry. London: Methuen, 1981.
Friedman, M. “The Methodology of Positive Economics”
in Readings in the Philosophy
of the Social Sciences. Ed. Brodbeck. New York: Macmillan, 1968.
Hempel, Carl G.
“Explanation in Science and in History” in Conceptions of Inquiry
Ed.
Stuart Brown & Co. London: Methuen, 1981.
Hospers, John.
An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1974.
Pratt, Vernon. The Philosophy
of the Social
Sciences. London: Methuen, 1985.
Winch, Peter. “ The Idea of a Social Science” in Conceptions of Inquiry
Ed. Brown
Stuart & Co. London: Methuen, 1981.
Wright, G. H. Von.
Explanations and Understanding. London:
Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1971.